DirectDemocracyS — DDS

Global Direct Democracy System

National political, economic, financial and social program

Republic of Tunisia

A critical analysis of the current reality, and a comprehensive implementation plan for building a genuine, prosperous, secure, and just direct democracy, owned solely by the Tunisian people, forever.

Prepared by: DirectDemocracyS (DDS)

In collaboration with the ddsAI / allddsAI collaborative artificial intelligence system

Strategic reference document — open to updates and collective consultation

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.............. 1

Introduction: Who we are, and what we propose for Tunisia............................. 1

The core principles that we will not compromise on................................ 1

Methodology of Analysis. 1

Part One: A Critical Diagnosis of the Current Tunisian Reality................ 1

1.1 The political situation: concentration of power and shrinking democratic space............................ 1

Prisoners of conscience and imprisoned opposition.................. 1

The Independent Electoral Commission and the implications of pluralism.................... 1

The stance on sovereignty and foreign relations.................... 1

1.2 The economic and financial situation: accumulated fragility and risky choices.................. 1

Public debt and dangerous monetary financing.................... 1

Break with the International Monetary Fund......................... 1

Natural resources: Phosphate as a model of missed opportunity. 1

The dinar and the image of apparent stability...................... 1

1.3 Social situation: Tunisia's forgotten interior, its devastated environment, and double migration...................... 1

Unemployment, especially among young people............. 1

The Gabes Crisis: When Wealth Turns into Poison................. 1

Gafsa water crisis....... 1

Double migration: Tunisian youth flee, and African migrants are persecuted........... 1

1.4 Diagnosis Summary: A double crisis of confidence.................... 1

Part Two: The DDS Program — How to Return Power and Wealth to the Tunisian People................ 1

2.1 The political program: Tunisia's peaceful path towards direct democracy.................................... 1

Micro-groups: The first seed of grassroots power........................ 1

Fractal Governance..... 1

ddsAI and allddsAI: Honest information as a weapon against misinformation........... 1

The three-digit identity system and the NTCO system: security against tampering and hacking...................... 1

GUMI-SV: Unified Global Governance and Shared Values............ 1

Real-world implementation stages 1

2.2 The Economic and Financial Program: Tunisia's wealth for Tunisia, with transparency and efficiency...................... 1

1. Open public audit of public debt................. 1

2. Reforming the mechanism for financing the public deficit and putting an end to direct cash financing.................... 1

3. The transparent sovereign wealth fund for phosphates........... 1

4. Supporting the local productive economy and cooperatives........ 1

Expected financial and economic results........ 1

2.3 Social Program: Regional Justice, a Healthy Environment, and Dignity for All.......... 1

1. Employment: From temporary public sector employment to permanent economic integration................. 1

2. Gabes and Gafsa: From “environmental assassination” to genuine, funded reform................................. 1

3. Migration: Addressing the root causes instead of exporting the rhetoric. 1

4. Regional justice: Breaking the coastal-inland dichotomy........ 1

Part Three: Tunisian identity is preserved, pluralism is protected........ 1

3.1 Arab-Islamic identity, and the Amazigh and Jewish components........ 1

3.2 Language................ 1

3.3 Political Pluralism and Opposition..................... 1

3.4 Trade Unions and Civil Society................... 1

3.5 Protection from media manipulation and brainwashing................. 1

Part Four: Expected Results from Adopting the DDS Model............................... 1

4.1 On the political level. 1

4.2 On the economic and financial level................ 1

4.3 On the social and environmental level........ 1

4.4 Realistic Estimated Timetable...................... 1

Conclusion: The call to join 1

 

Introduction: Who we are, and what we propose for Tunisia

This document is issued by DirectDemocracyS (DDS), a global political system for direct democracy, built on the collective ownership of power and wealth, and on logic, common sense, in-depth study, realism, truth, methodological coherence, and mutual respect. We are not a party in the traditional sense that seeks power to represent the people, but rather an organizational and technical tool that effectively, permanently, continuously, and directly returns power to its rightful owners: the citizens themselves, in every village, neighborhood, city, and state.

This document presents a frank and well-documented critical analysis of the current Tunisian situation—political, economic, financial, and social—based on established facts and recent official and international figures, without favoring any party or bias towards any particular faction. We then present, in precise and practical detail, the program proposed by the DDS to address each problem with viable solutions, complete with concrete examples, implementation mechanisms, expected outcomes, and a realistic timeline.

The core principles that we will not compromise on

The DDS program in Tunisia, as in every country in the world without exception, is based on one non-negotiable principle: the wealth of every country, and the right to decide its own destiny, must remain forever and exclusively in the hands of its people. No monopoly by any political elite, ruling family, single party, foreign company or state, or even by the DDS itself. The role of the DDS is to provide the tools and structure that make this principle a lived reality, not just a slogan.

• Absolute transparency: Every decision, every financial figure, and every public contract is available to everyone in real time via DDS platforms.
• Direct and continuous participation: not just elections every four or five years, but a daily and continuous decision-making process through micro-groups.
• Technological neutrality: Artificial intelligence in the service of truth and the citizen, not in the service of any authority, propaganda, or funding entity.
• Absolute non-violence: Change is achieved through organization, knowledge, and accumulated popular legitimacy, not through confrontation, coups, or weapons.
• Respect for identity: No infringement on the religion, language, culture, traditions, or political and intellectual pluralism of any people.

Methodology of Analysis

This document's analysis of the Tunisian reality relies on multiple, up-to-date sources up to June 2026, including data from the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics, reports from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the 2026 Finance Law, and reports from international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (2026 edition), in addition to on-the-ground journalistic coverage of events such as the protests in Gabes and Gafsa. The aim is not to issue an ideological judgment, but rather to present an accurate and truthful picture that forms the basis for developing solutions.

Part One: A Critical Diagnosis of the Current Tunisian Reality

1.1 The political situation: concentration of power and shrinking democratic space

Since July 25, 2021, when President Kais Saied announced the suspension of parliament, the dismissal of the government, and his consolidation of executive and legislative power, Tunisia entered a new phase, described by many observers and opposition figures as a constitutional coup. This was followed in 2022 by the abrogation of the 2014 constitution, adopted after the 2011 revolution, and the adoption of a new constitution through a controversial referendum, establishing a highly centralized presidential system that leaves virtually no effective parallel or counterbalancing power to the president.

To this day, and for several consecutive years, the state of emergency declared in July 2021 remains in effect, granting the executive branch broad and exceptional powers outside the bounds of normal parliamentary and judicial oversight. Analysts and international human rights organizations agree that the Tunisian judiciary has largely lost its independence as a check on power and has, in a number of sensitive political cases, become a tool for persecuting dissidents, union leaders, journalists, and civil society activists.

Prisoners of conscience and imprisoned opposition

Human rights reports issued in 2026 document that the list of dissidents who received heavy judicial sentences has become long and diverse in its political affiliations:

• Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the Ennahda movement, which dominated the Tunisian political scene for more than a decade after 2011, received a final sentence of life imprisonment on charges of forming a parallel security apparatus, in addition to previous sentences exceeding forty years in prison in other cases.
• Ahmed Najib Chebbi, the 81-year-old head of the opposition National Salvation Front, was sentenced to twelve years in prison in a case known as “conspiracy against state security.”
• Issam Chebbi and Ghazi Chaouachi, leaders of opposition social democratic movements, have been under arrest since February 2023.
• Abir Moussi, the head of the Free Constitutional Party, has been under arrest since October 2023, and was also sentenced to two years in prison for criticizing the electoral process.
• Sonia Dahmani, a lawyer and journalist, Ayachi Hammami, a lawyer and human rights defender, and Chaima Issa, an opposition activist, are among dozens of people detained in similar cases.
• Moncef Marzouki, the former president of the republic, was sentenced in absentia to twenty-two years in prison on terrorism charges.
• Ali Larayedh, the former head of government, was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison in February 2026.

Researchers specializing in Tunisian affairs estimate that the number of prisoners of conscience may be approaching one thousand people, a figure that, according to these researchers, recalls the numbers that prevailed in the latter part of the era of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was overthrown by the 2010-2011 revolution.

The Independent Electoral Commission and the implications of pluralism

President Saied personally appointed the members of the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE), which casts serious doubt on the body's impartiality and led traditional opposition parties to boycott the elections held during his term. Furthermore, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the country's largest labor union, with its long history and significant negotiating power, is facing increasing pressure aimed, according to analysts, at isolating it and weakening its bargaining capacity as a social force opposing the government.

The stance on sovereignty and foreign relations

The Tunisian regime adopts a “sovereign” discourse rejecting any “foreign interference” in its internal affairs, sometimes using this rhetoric to justify its refusal to implement reforms or to address international criticism regarding human rights. At the same time, Tunisia’s relations with the West are strained while its ties with Algeria are strengthening within a new regional axis.

There is no true democracy without legally protected pluralism, without an independent judiciary, and without a free press; and what exists today in Tunisia is an unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of one individual, whatever the declared intentions.

1.2 The economic and financial situation: accumulated fragility and risky choices

Tunisia's GDP recorded weak growth of 1.6% in 2024, driven primarily by the recovery of the tourism sector (+17%) and the resilience of the textile and mechanical industries. This growth rose to approximately 2.5% in 2025, according to the National Institute of Statistics, thanks to the contribution of agriculture and services. However, for 2026, there is a notable discrepancy between the Tunisian government's projections of 3.3% growth in the new budget law and the more conservative estimates of the International Monetary Fund, which do not exceed 2.1%. This reflects the fragility and instability of the economic recovery.

The inflation rate has declined relatively from its peak of 10.4% in February 2023 to an annual average of 6.1% in 2024, which is a tangible improvement, but it does not mean the end of the pressure on the purchasing power of Tunisian families, especially in light of the continued rise in the prices of basic commodities.

Public debt and dangerous monetary financing

Tunisia’s public debt reached a very high level of 84.5% of GDP at the end of 2024 and continued to rise during 2025 and 2026, approaching 85%. Even more alarming than the size of the debt is the method of financing it: from 2024 until the 2026 budget, the government resorted to financing a large portion of the public deficit directly through the Central Bank of Tunisia, amounting to $2.3 billion during 2024-2025, with a plan to withdraw an additional $3.8 billion during 2026. This practice—a form of direct monetary financing of the deficit—is considered illegal by a number of economists and even by Tunisian law itself, and carries clear inflationary risks in the medium term, as “printing money” replaces genuine structural reform of public finances.

Break with the International Monetary Fund

In 2022, the Tunisian government signed a preliminary agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a $1.9 billion loan over four years, in exchange for a commitment to structural economic reforms (reforming subsidy funds and loss-making public institutions). However, President Saied withdrew from this agreement in 2023, fearing a backlash from the public over the required reforms, and describing "external dictates" as unacceptable. This "sovereign" choice postponed financial collapse but deprived Tunisia of accessible and reliable financing, pushing it towards more costly and riskier long-term alternatives, such as direct financing from the central bank.

Natural resources: Phosphate as a model of missed opportunity

Tunisia possesses one of the world's largest phosphate reserves in the Gafsa Basin, and the government is aiming to increase production to 14 million tons per year by 2030, while expanding chemical processing capacity by 80% by 2028. However, this strategic sector has historically suffered from a lack of transparency in the distribution of its revenues to producing entities, and from severe environmental and health damage (which will be detailed in the social section), while the economic model continues to export the raw or semi-processed material instead of investing sufficiently in high value-added processing that creates more sustainable local employment opportunities.

The dinar and the image of apparent stability

The government promotes the Tunisian dinar as the strongest African currency, which is true in terms of its relative stability compared to neighboring currencies, but it does not necessarily reflect the soundness of the macroeconomy. Rather, it partially reflects a strict intervention policy from the central bank and exchange restrictions, at a time when the trade deficit and reliance on debt to finance the budget continue.

Fragile economic growth, mounting debt financed in unconventional and risky ways, and huge natural resources that do not translate into equitable prosperity for the populations of the producing regions: this is the financial equation that Tunisia faces today.

1.3 Social situation: Tunisia's forgotten interior, its devastated environment, and double migration

Unemployment, especially among young people

Unemployment among Tunisian youth remains very high, approaching 40%, a figure that reflects a structural failure accumulated over decades to create sufficient and decent job opportunities, despite successive governments and regimes since independence. The current government approach, within the framework of the 2026-2030 development plan, resorts to public sector employment as a quick fix to absorb unemployment. While this option may alleviate the crisis temporarily, according to economic analysts, it reverses the progress achieved in 2024-2025 in controlling the public sector wage bill and fails to address the root of the problem: the absence of a productive private sector capable of sustainably absorbing graduates from universities and vocational institutes.

The Gabes Crisis: When Wealth Turns into Poison

The coastal oasis city of Gabes, described by ancient travelers as exceptionally beautiful, is the clearest example of the environmental and health costs of the phosphate mining model. Since 1972, the Tunisian Chemical Group (GCT) has been converting Gafsa phosphate into phosphoric acid and chemical fertilizers at a site near the city, dumping between 14,000 and 15,000 tons of phosphogypsum—a toxic byproduct—directly into coastal waters every day, in addition to high-concentration emissions of ammonia, nitrogen oxides, and sulfates.

The result is well-documented and tragic: dying trees, a sharp decline in fish stocks, and a significant increase in respiratory illnesses and cancers among the region's inhabitants. In October 2025, a general strike and mass protests organized by the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) paralyzed the entire city. Protesters chanted slogans such as "Gabes wants to live" and "Dismantle the polluting units," after more than 120 people were hospitalized with respiratory problems following a separate pollution incident in September 2025. President Saied described the situation as "environmental assassination," blaming previous governments. However, the plan to remove the polluting units, approved in principle since 2017, has never been implemented. The cost of treatment and dismantling is estimated at around 5 billion dinars ($1.7 billion), an amount the current government describes as "impossible to provide" given the current financial situation—at a time when billions of dollars are being allocated to finance the budget deficit through other mechanisms.

Gafsa water crisis

In the Gafsa mining region itself, where raw phosphate is extracted, residents suffer from a severe water crisis. According to the Tunisian Water Observatory, the region alone recorded fifteen protests related to thirst and water scarcity in June 2024. This paradox—a region from which the state extracts a vast strategic resource while its inhabitants lack potable water—is at the heart of the sense of injustice that fuels the recurring protests in the interior regions.

Double migration: Tunisian youth flee, and African migrants are persecuted

Tunisia is experiencing a two-way migration phenomenon that reveals the depth of the social and identity crisis:

• On the one hand, thousands of young Tunisians, especially from the interior regions and economically marginalized coastal areas such as Mahdia and Sfax, continue to attempt “illegal migration” to Europe to escape the lack of local economic prospects. One of the most recent tragedies, in October 2025 off the coast of Mahdia, claimed the lives of more than forty migrants from sub-Saharan Africa when their boat sank.
• On the other hand, since President Saied's speech to the National Security Council in February 2023, Tunisia has witnessed a dangerous wave of hate speech and systematic violence against migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. In that speech, the president spoke of a "criminal plot" aimed at changing Tunisia's "demographic composition," a formulation close to the racist "Great Replacement" theory promoted by the European far right, and which has indeed been met with praise from far-right European political figures.

Amnesty International, based on a field investigation conducted between February 2023 and June 2025 involving 120 refugees and migrants from approximately 20 countries, indicates that at least 60 people, including minors, were arbitrarily detained as part of a systematic campaign of racial profiling by security forces. According to a 2022 BBC News Arabic poll, 80% of Tunisians believe that racial discrimination is a real problem in their country—the highest percentage recorded in the Middle East and North Africa region. This is despite the existence of a progressive Tunisian anti-discrimination law passed in 2018, the implementation of which, according to Amnesty International, remains extremely weak. It is worth noting that the actual number of refugees and asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa in Tunisia does not exceed tens of thousands, according to the United Nations, while media and political discourse often inflates the figures to hundreds of thousands or even millions.

The internal regions that produce wealth are the most deprived of its fruits; and the discourse that should have addressed a real economic and social crisis has turned, in part, into hate speech that harms Tunisia’s image and the dignity of its Black population, whether Tunisian or immigrant.

1.4 Diagnosis Summary: A double crisis of confidence

This analysis reveals a dual crisis of confidence that Tunisia is experiencing today: a political crisis of confidence between the government and a broad sector of elites, the opposition, and civil society, managed by a logic of exclusion and criminalization instead of dialogue and pluralism; and an economic and social crisis of confidence between the state and the citizen, especially in the interior regions and wealth-producing areas, who see their wealth extracted without reaping a fair return from it, neither in local development nor in protecting the health of their inhabitants and their environment.

What all these crises have in common is the absence of an effective, daily, direct, and reliable mechanism that allows Tunisian citizens to decide, monitor, and hold their leaders accountable. This is precisely what the DDS proposes in the following sections of this document—not as a slogan, but as a technical and organizational system that can be activated immediately.

Part Two: The DDS Program — How to Return Power and Wealth to the Tunisian People

The DDS does not propose a ready-made, imported ideological prescription, but rather a practical system adapted to the specific Tunisian reality as diagnosed above: a highly centralized presidential system, a jailed or marginalized opposition, a state of perpetual emergency, a debt-ridden economy, and a society geographically divided between a benefiting coast and a depleted interior. The solution we propose operates on three parallel and complementary levels: political, economic-financial, and social.

2.1 The political program: Tunisia's peaceful path towards direct democracy

We are fully aware that Tunisia today lives under a highly centralized system, where traditional institutional channels for change (free and competitive elections, an effective parliament, an independent judiciary, and a free press) are either severely restricted or virtually nonexistent. It is precisely in this context that the DDS model was designed to function: it does not aim to directly confront or clash with the central authority, but rather to build a parallel class of genuine popular power, growing gradually from the grassroots, outside the realm of direct repression, and deriving its legitimacy from its tangible, everyday benefits to the citizen, not from confrontation with the state.

Micro-groups: The first seed of grassroots power

The basic unit in the DDS system is the "microgroup": a small gathering of citizens (in their neighborhood, village, workplace, university, or even online) who meet to discuss their immediate concerns and make their own decisions about matters that affect them, using the secure DDS digital platform. These groups:

• They do not require a party or government license to be established; they are legally free civil gatherings, similar to a neighborhood association, a cultural club, or an economic cooperation group.
• Initially, it deals with concrete, everyday practical issues that do not directly provoke authority: improving local services, organizing a farmer's or craft cooperative, exchanging reliable information about prices, health and education, and coordinating mutual assistance between neighbors.
• It gradually expands according to a “fractal” logic: each group that succeeds and proves its usefulness branches out into new groups, and connects horizontally with groups of neighboring neighborhoods and villages, until a dense national network of direct collective decision-making is formed.
• It has no centralized leadership: there is no single "leader" who can be arrested to paralyze the entire movement, unlike traditional parties which we have seen dismantled by imprisoning their historical leaders.

By this logic, even in the absence of free elections or a functioning parliament, the Tunisian people are gradually building their own parallel authority: a real collective decision-making network, starting with everyday life issues and then expanding to include, when the time is right and sufficient collective maturity and popular legitimacy are available, major national issues — without any need for violent confrontation or a counter-coup, but rather through a quiet, steady accumulation that cannot be contained by imprisoning an individual or banning a party.

Fractal Governance

Unlike the traditional hierarchical power structure—where decisions flow from the top down—the DDS system operates on the reverse logic: decisions ascend from the base (the micro-group) to higher levels of coordination (neighborhood, city, state, and national), without the base ever losing its original authority. Each higher level merely coordinates and implements the decisions of the level below it; no higher authority dictates it. This makes it virtually impossible to "take over" the entire system by controlling a single central point, a structural weakness exploited by any system that concentrates power in the hands of one individual, as is the case in Tunisia today.

ddsAI and allddsAI: Honest information as a weapon against misinformation

One of the most dangerous tools of any authoritarian regime is the monopolization of information and the media narrative—a fact clearly demonstrated in how political discourse on immigration transformed into a widespread wave of racist hatred within a few days. DDS provides its users and group members in Tunisia with the ddsAI system, a network of specialized artificial intelligence models (economics, law, health, environment, history) that informs citizens comprehensively, accurately, impartially, and independently of any political, governmental, or external funding. Furthermore, allddsAI, a system of “artificial intelligence democracy,” operates, where the AI models themselves engage in completely transparent discussions with the user on any controversial issue. Citizens can then directly witness the formation of the most balanced and logical answer, rather than receiving a single opinion imposed by one entity (whether governmental, partisan, or media).

In this way, any Tunisian can verify for himself, within minutes, the validity of any political speech presented to him — whether it is an official government speech or hate speech targeting a particular group — based on documented data and sources, not on directed propaganda.

The three-digit identity system and the NTCO system: security against tampering and hacking.

DDS recognizes that any open, participatory platform is vulnerable to two fundamental risks: vote manipulation (fake accounts, duplicate voting) and security breaches by entities hostile to the project itself (whether security agencies attempting to infiltrate and dismantle groups, or malicious actors seeking to sow chaos within them). To counter this, DDS employs a three-digit identity verification system that ensures each vote counts for only one real citizen, without requiring the public disclosure of their full identity—thus protecting the privacy and security of members, especially in a repressive context like the current Tunisian one, where activists are subjected to arbitrary arrest. This protection is complemented by the NTCO system, which monitors and counters attempts at manipulation, infiltration, and organized disinformation within DDS platforms, safeguarding Tunisian groups from any internal or external infiltration or sabotage attempts.

GUMI-SV: Unified Global Governance and Shared Values

Through the GUMI-SV system, Tunisian groups engage in the global DDS network, benefiting from the experiences of similar groups in other countries that have faced similar challenges (authoritarian concentration, industrial environmental crises, sovereign debt crises, migration and identity tensions), without losing their national, cultural and religious particularity, which always remains a purely local Tunisian decision (see Part Three).

Real-world implementation stages

1. Phase One — The Quiet Sowing: Establishing small groups around purely local service and economic issues (water, waste, cooperatives, youth employment), first in the most marginalized regions (Gabes, Gafsa, the interior regions), where the actual need for a solution is greater than any political caution.
2. Phase Two — Horizontal Interconnection: Linking successful groups together via the secure digital DDS platform, to exchange experiences and resources, and to build a decentralized national network that is difficult to hack or dismantle all at once.
3. The third stage — legitimate accumulation: As the network expands and its tangible benefit to an increasing number of Tunisians is proven, it gradually gains real social and economic weight, making it difficult for any authority to ignore or suppress it without a heavy political cost, given its clearly peaceful, service-oriented, non-violent nature.
4. The fourth stage — peaceful constitutional transition: When popular maturity and sufficient legitimacy are available, the network of smaller groups becomes able to put forward, with a unified voice and real negotiating power, a demand for constitutional reform that re-establishes the separation of powers and constitutionally guarantees the mechanisms of direct democracy (initiative popular referendum, continuous accountability of elected officials, budget transparency) alongside existing representative institutions, through a comprehensive national dialogue, not through imposition or confrontation.

We do not wait for permission from any authority to begin building our direct democracy; we start from the village, the neighborhood and the workplace, today, with purely peaceful and legal tools, and we accumulate until the voice of the Tunisian people becomes a force that cannot be ignored.

2.2 The Economic and Financial Program: Tunisia's wealth for Tunisia, with transparency and efficiency

The DDS economic vision for Tunisia is based on a firm principle: there can be no genuine Tunisian economic solution without complete transparency in the management of public debt, without equitable distribution of natural resource revenues (primarily phosphates), and without breaking the cycle of false choice between "painful external dictates" and "risky monetary financing." There is a third way, proposed by the DDS, based on direct and continuous public oversight of public finances.

1. Open public audit of public debt

DDS, through its specialized microgroups supported by independent economic and financial experts and the ddsAI system, proposes a public and comprehensive audit of the components of Tunisia’s public debt, which amounts to about 85% of GDP: what part of it actually went to productive investment, and what part went to cover operating expenses or accrued interest? This audit, published in full and in simplified language for every citizen via the DDS platform, is the first step towards any real future negotiation with international creditors, and towards restoring domestic confidence in the public budget.

2. Reforming the mechanism for financing the public deficit and putting an end to direct cash financing.

The DDS calls for setting a time limit and a clear ceiling on the practice of directly financing the budget deficit through the central bank—an exceptional practice implemented from 2024 to 2026 with a cumulative value exceeding $6 billion—and a gradual return to financing that respects the central bank's independence and its role in curbing inflation. The alternative proposed by the DDS is not a return to subservience to the conditions imposed by international institutions from abroad, but rather building Tunisia's own negotiating power, based on transparent figures (which naturally increases confidence among investors and creditors) and on broadening the domestic revenue base by combating widespread tax evasion and the informal economy, instead of simply burdening the middle and lower classes with additional taxes.

3. The transparent sovereign wealth fund for phosphates

DDS proposes the creation of a sovereign wealth fund dedicated to phosphate revenues and related chemical industries, managed under direct and continuous oversight by micro-groups in the producing regions (Gafsa, Gabes, Sfax, Mahdia) through the transparent DDS platform, to be allocated according to a clear and publicly announced distribution key:

Spending destination	Proposed ratio	Direct target
Immediate environmental and health treatment in Gabes and Gafsa	30%	Dismantling contaminated units, water treatment, specialized healthcare
Direct local development decided by small groups	25%	Infrastructure, drinking water, education, local youth employment
Investment in high value-added transformation	25%	Reducing raw material exports, creating sustainable industrial jobs
A national reserve fund for debt repayment with transparency	20%	A gradual and documented reduction of the public debt burden

This distribution is not a decision imposed from above, but rather a starting point that is subject to discussion and modification by the smaller groups within the concerned parties themselves, through a direct and transparent voting mechanism.

4. Supporting the local productive economy and cooperatives

Through a micro-financing mechanism organized within the micro-groups themselves and with technical support from ddsAI in the areas of market, accounting and commercial law, DDS encourages the creation of agricultural, craft and local micro-industries cooperatives in the marginalized interior regions, with the aim of creating real economic alternatives that reduce the total dependence of Tunisian youth on either scarce public sector jobs or on irregular migration as the only option.

Expected financial and economic results

• In the short term (1-2 years): Full transparency in the budget and phosphate revenues will restore some of the popular and international confidence, and alleviate social pressure in the producing regions.
• In the medium term (3-5 years): a gradual decline in reliance on direct cash financing, an increase in domestic tax revenues through shrinking the parallel economy, and greater stability in the inflation rate.
• In the long term (5-10 years): Real economic diversification based on value-added industrial transformation, and a gradual and documented decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio, within a truly sovereign Tunisian path, not just in name.

2.3 Social Program: Regional Justice, a Healthy Environment, and Dignity for All

1. Employment: From temporary public sector employment to permanent economic integration

Instead of relying solely on public employment as a solution to high youth unemployment (around 40%), DDS proposes a dual system: on the one hand, an interactive employment map constantly updated by ddsAI, directly linking the skills available in each region with the actual needs of the local and international market, instead of university and vocational training that is detached from economic reality; and on the other hand, direct support for the creation of cooperatives and micro and small enterprises through microgroups, with participatory financing and legal and accounting frameworks provided by ddsAI free of charge to each member.

2. Gabes and Gafsa: From “environmental assassination” to genuine, funded reform

As mentioned in Part 1, the cost of treating and dismantling the polluting units in Gabès is estimated at approximately $1.7 billion, an amount the government deems impossible to secure. DDS proposes breaking this deadlock through direct funding from the Phosphate Sovereign Wealth Fund (see table above; 30% of revenues are immediately allocated to environmental and health remediation), with a publicly available and binding timetable monitored step-by-step by local micro-groups in Gabès and Gafsa, instead of general promises lacking implementation commitment and transparency. This fund would also be used to urgently and directly finance solutions to the water crisis in Gafsa, a basic right of the population in a region that produces a strategic national resource.

3. Migration: Addressing the root causes instead of exporting the rhetoric

DDS deals with the immigration file from two complementary and non-contradictory angles:

• For Tunisian youth who wish to emigrate to escape the lack of opportunities: the real solution is not just security prevention, but creating a real local economic horizon through the employment programs and cooperatives mentioned above, in addition to opening regular, safe and negotiated migration channels on an equal footing with European partners, instead of leaving young people prey to deadly smuggling networks.
• For sub-Saharan African migrants residing in Tunisia: DDS categorically rejects any discourse that incites racial hatred or promotes theories of “demographic replacement,” and calls for the effective and strict application of the 2018 Tunisian law against racial discrimination, through a popular monitoring and follow-up mechanism in which the same microgroups participate to monitor and transparently document cases of violation and discrimination, in parallel with awareness campaigns based on official facts and figures (not rumors) provided by ddsAI, to counter the media and digital exaggeration that turns tens of thousands into an imagined “invasion” in the collective consciousness.

4. Regional justice: Breaking the coastal-inland dichotomy

DDS proposes that the allocation of public investment between regions be a participatory decision determined, at least in part, by microgroups in each state according to their actual priorities, which are known locally better than any central planning far from Tunis, with the publication of a transparent and periodic index to measure public spending per capita in each region, allowing every Tunisian to compare for himself, digitally and publicly, his region’s share of national investment.

The wealth of Gabes and Gafsa must remain first and foremost for the people of Gabes and Gafsa; and the dignity of every person living on Tunisian soil, whether Tunisian or immigrant, is a red line that cannot be compromised.

Part Three: Tunisian identity is preserved, pluralism is protected

The DDS clearly distinguishes between political and administrative power—which must be direct, transparent, and collectively vested in the people—and the cultural, religious, and civilizational identity of the Tunisian people, which is not subject to negotiation or modification by any external or internal entity, including the DDS itself. Our role is to provide the instrument for collective decision-making, not to impose any alternative ideological or cultural vision.

3.1 Arab-Islamic identity, and the Amazigh and Jewish components

The DDS system is committed to fully respecting the overarching Arab-Islamic identity of the majority of the Tunisian people and the historically dominant Maliki school of thought, while simultaneously fully protecting the country's historical minority groups: the Amazigh people of southern Tunisia (Douz, Tataouine, Djerba) with their culture, language, and traditions, and the long-established Tunisian Jewish community in Djerba (El Ghriba) and Tunis, which has been an integral part of the Tunisian fabric for thousands of years. Each of these smaller groups is completely free to organize its cultural and religious affairs as it sees fit, without any central interference.

3.2 Language

The DDS platforms respect and support the use of Modern Standard Arabic as an official language, Tunisian Arabic as the natural language of daily communication for smaller groups, Tamazight (Berber) where it is spoken, and French as a working language and international communication widely used in Tunisian administration, education, and the economy. DDS does not impose any single language but allows each group to work in the language chosen by its members.

3.3 Political Pluralism and Opposition

The DDS fundamentally and explicitly defends the right of every Tunisian to choose their political affiliation, whether left or right, Islamist or secular, and the right of the opposition to organize, express itself, and run for office without legal or security harassment. The DDS does not seek to replace existing political parties (whether ruling or opposition), but rather provides an additional layer of direct participation that coexists with and monitors them transparently and objectively, regardless of their affiliation.

In fact, DDS sees the release of prisoners of conscience and the guarantee of fair trials in accordance with international standards as one of the most important indicators of the success of any real reform path in Tunisia, and it clearly calls for this within its accumulated peaceful demands through the network of small groups.

3.4 Trade Unions and Civil Society

The DDS supports the independence of the Tunisian General Labour Union and all other trade unions and civil associations, as essential balancing forces necessary in any truly democratic system, and rejects any attempt to weaken or isolate them, regardless of who is trying to do so.

3.5 Protection from media manipulation and brainwashing

Through its digital security system, DDS platforms provide technical and technological protection against organized disinformation campaigns, algorithmic manipulation, and multimedia "brainwashing" attempts—whether originating internally (official, one-sided propaganda) or externally (fake accounts, foreign digital interference). Every member of a Tunisian microgroup has the right to verify, via ddsAI, the source and credibility of any information or message they receive before making any collective decision.

Part Four: Expected Results from Adopting the DDS Model

4.1 On the political level

• A gradual and peaceful building of a culture of direct collective decision-making, reducing the tension and sharp polarization that exists today between the government and the opposition, through a third, peaceful and practical channel.
• There is accumulated and peaceful popular pressure, which is difficult to ignore because it is decentralized and not linked to a single leadership that can be targeted, towards restoring the balance between the authorities and releasing prisoners of conscience.
• Hate speech will gradually decline when fact-checking becomes readily available and direct to every citizen via ddsAI.

4.2 On the economic and financial level

• Budget transparency and phosphate revenues restore a key part of domestic and international confidence in the Tunisian economy, without the need to give up national sovereignty in economic decision-making.
• A gradual and documented decline in reliance on risky direct cash financing, and greater stability in inflation and the dinar.
• Creating real and sustainable job opportunities through value-added industrial transformation and local cooperatives, instead of financially unsustainable temporary public employment.

4.3 On the social and environmental level

• A real and funded start to address the environmental and health disaster in Gabes, with a public timetable monitored by the local groups themselves.
• A gradual solution to the water crisis in Gafsa and other affected inland regions.
• There has been a noticeable decline in the motives for irregular migration among Tunisian youth, thanks to the creation of a real local economic horizon.
• Effective protection and follow-up of the dignity and safety of African migrants residing in Tunisia, and improving Tunisia’s international image in this regard.

4.4 Realistic Estimated Timetable

Stage	Expected achievements
First year	Establishment of the first micro-groups in Gabes, Gafsa and the interior regions; launch of the Tunisian ddsAI platform; commencement of the public audit of public debt.
Years 2-3	Expansion of the national network of groups; launch of the sovereign wealth fund for phosphates; commencement of environmental remediation works in Gabes.
Years 4-5	The network's popular legitimacy has matured; the demand for unified constitutional reform has been put forward through a national dialogue; there has been a tangible decline in youth unemployment in the relevant regions.
Years 5-10	Constitutional commitment to the mechanisms of direct democracy; financial stability and genuine economic diversification; Tunisia as a regional model for a peaceful and participatory transition towards good governance.

Conclusion: The call to join

This document is not a theoretical statement, but a direct, practical call to every Tunisian man and woman: in the neighborhood, in the village, at the university, at the workplace, to establish the first small group and actually begin, today, to build the direct popular power that the Tunisian people deserve, the people who have the oldest revolution in the region, and who have the full and permanent right to their wealth and to their national decision.

DDS does not wait for authorization from any existing authority to begin this path. It is a purely civil, peaceful, and legal path, open to all who believe in logic, common sense, truth, cohesion, and mutual respect as the basis for building Tunisia’s future.

DirectDemocracyS — Power to the people, wealth to the people, forever