DIRECTDEMOCRACYS

Global System of Direct Democracy

NATIONAL DDS PROGRAMME

REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI

Political, economic, financial and social program

Logic — Common sense — Truth — Coherence — Study — Reality — Mutual respect

Document prepared by DirectDemocracyS (DDS)

in collaboration with allddsAI — DDS Artificial Intelligence Democracy

2026

Table of Contents

Table of Contents...................... 1

Introduction — DDS: a method, not a promise............................ 1

PART I — DIAGNOSIS: THE REAL SITUATION IN BURUNDI............ 1

1.1 — A power locked in for two decades.......................... 1

1.2 — An economy on life support, a suffocating population............................. 1

1.3 — A youth without a future, fundamental rights under pressure...................... 1

1.4 — A regional crisis that directly affects the country... 1

1.5 — National wealth: who decides, and for whose benefit?................................. 1

PART II — WHY THE CURRENT SYSTEM CANNOT REFORM ITSELF........................................ 1

2.1 — The trap of the de facto single party............................ 1

2.2 — Rewarding loyalty rather than competence....... 1

2.3 — Opacity as a method of governance............................ 1

2.4 — External dependence as an economic prison............... 1

PART III — THE DDS PROGRAMME FOR BURUNDI.... 1

3.1 — The founding principles, which are non-negotiable............................. 1

3.2 — The DDS political architecture: from micro-groups to fractal governance 1

3.3 — The peaceful transition of power, without rigged elections and without violence................................. 1

3.4 — ddsAI and allddsAI: comprehensive, competent, neutral and incorruptible information........................... 1

3.5 — The three-code identity system: security against fraud and manipulation.................. 1

3.6 — GUMI-SV: the direct, continuous and secure voice of the Burundian people....... 1

3.7 — Economic sovereignty: the wealth of Burundi belongs, forever, to the Burundian people................. 1

3.8 — Detailed Economic and Financial Program................. 1

3.8.1 — Ending the fuel shortage permanently...... 1

3.8.2 — Monetary stabilization and exchange rate reform........................ 1

3.8.3 — Tax reform and the fight against corruption.... 1

3.8.4 — Mining sector: nickel, rare earths, gold.... 1

3.8.5 — Agriculture and food security..................... 1

3.8.6 — Debt and relations with international donors. 1

3.9 — Social Programme....... 1

3.9.1 — Health.................. 1

3.9.2 — Education............. 1

3.9.3 — Refugees and regional cohesion.............. 1

3.9.4 — Reconciliation and national cohesion, beyond quotas............................... 1

3.10 — Absolute respect for traditions, cultures, languages, religions, opposition groups and minorities.............................. 1

PART IV — IMPLEMENTATION: CONCRETE STEPS AND TIMETABLE................................ 1

PART V — ANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES AND EXPECTED BENEFITS................................... 1

Conclusion................................. 1

 

Introduction — DDS: a method, not a promise

DirectDemocracyS (DDS) is neither a party nor just another movement promising what it cannot deliver. DDS is a system of governance founded on five non-negotiable principles: logic , common sense , truth , consistency , and mutual respect . This document is not an election manifesto. It is a program of political, economic, financial, and social engineering, built upon a rigorous study of the actual situation in Burundi in 2026, and intended to be implemented, verified, corrected, and continuously improved by the Burundian people themselves—not by an elite speaking on their behalf.

Burundi doesn't need a new savior, a new party, or another cycle of promises followed by another cycle of disappointments. Burundi needs a system that makes the confiscation of power, the confiscation of wealth, and the confiscation of truth structurally impossible. This is precisely what DDS is building, country by country, micro-group by micro-group.

This document is structured in five parts: an unflinching diagnosis of the country's actual situation; an analysis of the structural reasons why the current system cannot reform itself from within; the complete DDS program — political, economic, financial and social; a concrete implementation timetable; and the expected, measurable consequences of each proposed reform.

PART I — DIAGNOSIS: THE REAL SITUATION IN BURUNDI

DDS rejects the two usual stances taken towards Burundi: the sensationalism that reduces the country to its crises, and the official denial that presents a facade of democratic normalcy. Here are the facts, as they are, without flattery or catastrophism.

1.1 — A power locked in for two decades

Since 2005, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), born out of the civil war rebellion (1993-2005), has held undisputed sway over Burundian political life. The current president, Évariste Ndayishimiye, in office since 2020, succeeded Pierre Nkurunziza, maintaining the same political apparatus. The pluralism envisioned by the 2000 Arusha Agreement, which ended the civil war through a negotiated power-sharing agreement between ethnic and political groups, has now been rendered meaningless.

The main opposition party, Agathon Rwasa's National Council for Liberty (CNL), which came second in the 2020 elections, was suspended in 2023 by the Ministry of the Interior for alleged "irregularities" in the organization of its meetings. At the end of 2024, while its leader was abroad, the CNL was taken over by a pro-government leadership, in a move widely perceived as orchestrated by the government. Rwasa and his associates were subsequently barred from joining another party or running as independents.

As a direct consequence, in the legislative and municipal elections of June 5, 2025, deprived of their main opponent, the CNDD-FDD won all 100 seats in the National Assembly. The senatorial elections of July 2025 followed the same pattern, with the CNDD-FDD securing all 13 Senate seats. Independent observers and analysts have labeled the other candidates as "token candidates," present only to create the appearance of nonexistent pluralism.

On the ground, activists, journalists, and human rights defenders report threats, harassment, and sometimes attacks by the Imbonerakure, the youth wing affiliated with the government, which operates with near-total impunity. A fuel shortage that has paralyzed the country for almost three years has further hampered the electoral campaigns of independent candidates, while candidates from the ruling party have had access to state logistical support.

The observation is simple and verifiable: a de facto single party, a real opposition eliminated administratively rather than through elections, and institutions that validate rather than control. This is not a political opinion—it is the description of a closed system.

1.2 — An economy on life support, a suffocating population

Burundi's economic situation in 2025-2026 was that of a country on the brink of collapse, which had only stabilized under the pressure of severe fiscal adjustments imposed by the urgent need for external financing. Inflation reached approximately 45.5% year-on-year in April 2025, before falling back to 10.8% in March 2026 thanks to strengthened fiscal discipline and better coordination between fiscal and monetary policy—a real improvement, but one achieved at the cost of severe cuts in public spending that are impacting essential services.

GDP growth remains structurally insufficient to meet the needs of a young and rapidly growing population: 3.3% in 2023, 3.9% in 2024, a revised forecast of 2.7% for 2025, and an expected average of only 3.1% per year between 2026 and 2030, according to the IMF. This level of growth is not enough to significantly reduce poverty in a country where 65.1% of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.

The current account deficit, already very high, is projected to worsen to 12.6% of GDP in 2025 and up to 14.9% in 2026, driven by deteriorating remittances and the trade balance. Official foreign exchange reserves remain extremely limited, the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates continues to weigh heavily on household purchasing power, and chronic fuel and gas shortages have hampered mobility, trade, and industrial production for nearly three years.

Indicator	Recent value	Source / period
Inflation (year-on-year change)	45.5% (April 2025) → 10.8% (March 2026)	IMF, Article IV mission 2026
Real GDP growth	3.9% (2024); 2.7% projected (2025); 3.1% average 2026-2030	IMF / African Development Bank
Population below the extreme poverty line ($2.15/day)	65.1%	African Development Bank
Current account deficit	12.6% of GDP (2025); 14.9% of GDP (2026, forecast)	African Development Bank
Fuel shortage	Structural crisis for about 3 years	Press reports and human rights organizations

In 2025-2026, the government embarked on a budget austerity effort presented as a "political choice that conditions the sovereignty of the State," with a stated priority on tax digitization, electronic invoicing, the digitization of land titles and the development of public real estate assets, as well as the revitalization of the mining sector. DDS acknowledges the technical relevance of several of these approaches—particularly tax and land digitization—while emphasizing that no management reform can produce a lasting effect if it is not accompanied by direct public oversight of the use of the revenue it generates.

In terms of infrastructure, the Uvinza–Musongati–Gitega regional railway project, intended to open up the country and develop its mineral resources, illustrates a potentially positive strategic direction — but its realization depends entirely on external financing and regional partners, which raises the central question of this program: who ultimately controls the terms of these agreements, and in whose interest are they negotiated?

1.3 — A youth without a future, fundamental rights under pressure

Burundi is a young country with a high birth rate, where the vast majority of the population has known only one system of government since birth. Access to education, healthcare, and employment remains structurally limited by low public revenue, a fragile healthcare system, and a lack of economic diversification. Freedom of expression, assembly, and the press remains severely restricted: since the 2015 crisis triggered by the contested candidacy of former President Pierre Nkurunziza for a third term, numerous civil society organizations and independent media outlets have been forced into exile, a situation that largely persists today despite the initial promises of dialogue and openness made by President Ndayishimiye upon taking office in 2020.

In September 2025, the director of the Belgian international cooperation agency Enabel was ordered to leave Burundian territory after sharing on a social network a cartoon evoking the fuel shortage — one sign among others of the regime's intolerance of criticism, including from international technical and financial partners.

1.4 — A regional crisis that directly affects the country

Burundi is directly affected by the escalating conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, marked by the offensive of the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel movement. The country has experienced one of the largest influxes of refugees in recent decades, placing considerable strain on already limited public services and resources. Furthermore, the Burundian government has deployed troops to South Kivu in support of the Congolese army, as part of a regional repositioning that has contributed to deteriorating relations with Rwanda, which Bujumbura accuses of harboring insurgents and suspected coup plotters.

This regional situation illustrates a structural vulnerability: a country whose internal balances are already fragile finds itself exposed to conflict dynamics that far exceed its capacity for autonomous response, due to a lack of sufficient financial reserves, economic diversification and internal political cohesion to absorb an external shock of this magnitude.

1.5 — National wealth: who decides, and for whose benefit?

Burundi possesses real and largely untapped natural resources: nickel, rare earth elements, gold, vanadium, as well as significant hydroelectric and agricultural potential. Between 1995 and 2018, however, renewable natural capital per capita declined by 66.3%, a consequence of unsustainable exploitation practices, while non-renewable natural capital per capita increased by 10.3%, indicating a shift towards mining as a new source of state revenue. The announced revitalization of the mining sector in the 2025-2026 budget confirms this strategic direction.

The question DDS poses is not whether Burundi's subsoil should be exploited—it must be, intelligently and sustainably, in service of the country's development. The question is: who negotiates the contracts, according to what transparency criteria, and who actually reaps the benefits? As long as decisions concerning national resources remain concentrated in the hands of a political apparatus not subject to direct and continuous popular control, there is no guarantee that the development of Burundi's subsoil will benefit the Burundian people rather than a small circle of decision-makers and external partners.

PART II — WHY THE CURRENT SYSTEM CANNOT REFORM ITSELF

It would be unfair and pointless to reduce the Burundian crisis to the ill will of any particular leader. DDS analyzes systems, not just individuals. And the current Burundian system has four structural flaws that doom any internal reform, however sincere, to failure or dilution.

2.1 — The trap of the de facto single party

When a single party controls 100% of the seats in the National Assembly and 100% of the seats in the Senate, there is, by design, no institutional mechanism of checks and balances. No adversarial parliamentary debate is possible. No independent commission of inquiry can be launched against the will of the executive branch. This is not a moral judgment, it is a mechanical description: a de facto single-chamber system cannot self-correct, regardless of the personal qualities of its leaders.

The administrative removal of the CNL, rather than its fair electoral defeat, is revealing: the Burundian government is not afraid of losing a debate of ideas; it prefers to prevent that debate from taking place. This is the difference between a democracy that wins elections and a system that eliminates its competitors before the vote.

2.2 — Rewarding loyalty rather than competence

In a de facto one-party system, political and administrative advancement is structurally dependent on loyalty to the dominant apparatus rather than technical competence. This mechanism operates independently of individual intentions: it is the very logic of the system that selects, at each level, the most loyal individuals rather than the most competent. The cumulative result, after two decades, is an administration where independent expertise—economic, financial, and technical—struggles to be freely expressed, even when it exists within the state apparatus itself.

2.3 — Opacity as a method of governance

The expulsion of an official from an international cooperation agency for sharing a simple cartoon on social media speaks volumes about the system's tolerance for criticism. A government that cannot tolerate humor about a fuel shortage is even less likely to tolerate open public debate on mining contract negotiations, the use of digitized tax revenues, or the terms of external financing agreements. Opacity is not a side effect of the system; it is a condition of its survival.

2.4 — External dependence as an economic prison

The recent macroeconomic stabilization, real and praised by the IMF, was achieved through fiscal austerity imposed as part of a normalization process with international lenders. This is a short-term technical necessity. But a country that regains a degree of stability only by complying with the conditions of external financing, without having simultaneously built genuine economic diversification and popular control over its own natural resources, remains structurally dependent and vulnerable to the slightest shock—be it climatic, regional, or financial. Externally imposed fiscal austerity is not economic sovereignty: it can be a prerequisite, or its permanent substitute, depending on how the country uses it.

Conclusion of Part II: None of these four dynamics—total parliamentary concentration, selection based on loyalty, opaque decision-making, and external dependence—can be corrected by simply changing the people at the top of the state. They require a change of system. This is precisely what DDS proposes: not a new power at the top, but a new decision-making mechanism at the grassroots level that makes these four pitfalls structurally impossible.

PART III — THE DDS PROGRAMME FOR BURUNDI

Here, in concrete terms, is what DDS proposes for Burundi: not a replacement of one ruling group by another, but the installation of a structural mechanism that makes the power of the Burundian people direct, continuous, informed, verifiable, and impossible to confiscate permanently — regardless of the party, the leader, or the parliamentary majority in place.

3.1 — The founding principles, which are non-negotiable

DDS applies the same fundamental rule everywhere in the world, without exception: the wealth of each country, and the power to decide for one's own country, belong forever and exclusively to the people of that country. Not to a local elite, nor to a foreign power, nor to a multinational corporation, nor to a political party, nor even to DDS itself as an organization. DDS never replaces the Burundian people: DDS provides them with the technical tools to directly exercise their own sovereignty.

• Logic and common sense : every proposed reform must be justifiable by verifiable reasoning, not by a promise or ideology.
• Truth and reality : diagnosis always precedes solution; DDS does not build any program on a distorted or flattered reality.
• Consistency : the same rules, the same anti-corruption and anti-manipulation guarantees apply to all actors, including DDS itself.
• Mutual respect : no DDS reform is imposed by force; each local micro-group freely decides its pace of adoption.
• Permanent popular ownership of national wealth : soil, subsoil, strategic resources and sovereignty decisions remain, forever, under the direct control of the Burundian people.

3.2 — The DDS political architecture: from micro-groups to fractal governance

At the heart of the DDS system is the micro-group : a cell of citizens, generally organized by neighborhood, village, hill, or professional community, that meets, deliberates, and decides on issues that directly concern it, before these decisions are escalated—or coordinated horizontally—to the next level. This model is described as "fractal": the same logic of direct and transparent decision-making is repeated at every level, from the hill to the national level, without any level being able to usurp the decisions of those lower down.

In concrete terms, for Burundi, this means that the 18 provinces, the communes, and even the hills—the country's most local administrative unit, already deeply rooted in Burundian political culture for decades—become the true starting point for public decision-making, and not the end point of a decision already made in Gitega or Bujumbura. DDS does not create an artificial structure imposed on the country: it builds upon Burundi's existing territorial architecture—hill, commune, province—to graft onto it a direct, verifiable, and continuous decision-making mechanism.

• Each hill or urban district forms a DDS micro-group, open to any verified resident, without conditions of partisan, ethnic or religious affiliation.
• The micro-groups coordinate their decisions at the municipal level, then at the provincial level, through a system of delegation that can be revoked at any time — a delegate who no longer faithfully represents his micro-group can be replaced immediately, without waiting for a general election.
• No national strategic decision (constitution, natural resources, debt, defense, major external relations) is valid without direct and verifiable consultation of all relevant micro-groups via the GUMI-SV platform (see 3.6).
• Fractal governance eliminates dependence on a single party: power is never permanently concentrated at a single level, because each level remains permanently accountable to the level that delegated it.

3.3 — The peaceful transition of power, without rigged elections and without violence

DDS knows that Burundi is a country where the existing system currently controls all electoral and parliamentary institutions. Therefore, DDS does not propose a new election within the current framework—a framework that has already demonstrated its capacity to administratively eliminate any real opposition before the vote. DDS proposes a different path, one already implemented by our organization in single-party states, authoritarian regimes, or countries without free elections: the construction, alongside the existing system, of a network of micro-citizen groups that exercise real power in deliberation, oversight, and local decision-making, without ever engaging in violent confrontation with the authorities in power.

1. Phase 1 — Discreet and legal implementation. DDS micro-groups are formed hill by hill, around concrete and undeniable needs: water management, food security, community health, and education. This implementation scrupulously respects the Burundian legal framework and does not seek any confrontation with the State.
2. Phase 2 — Identity verification and creation of the people's register. Each citizen joins their micro-group via the DDS three-code identity system (see 3.5), ensuring that no fraud, no duplication, no usurpation can taint the legitimacy of the people's register being constructed.
3. Phase 3 — Deliberation and direct expression via GUMI-SV. Once a critical number of active and verified micro-groups are reached, the GUMI-SV platform allows the Burundian people to directly express their positions on major national decisions — without having to wait for, or depend on, a vote organized by the ruling apparatus.
4. Phase 4 — Gradual recognition and institutional dialogue. With a verifiable and massive popular register, the DDS structure engages in dialogue with the authorities, international partners and civil society, to gradually have the decisions of micro-groups recognized as a legitimate mechanism of popular consultation, complementary and then, in the long term, decisive in national decision-making processes.
5. Phase 5 — Constitutional integration. The final objective is not a coup, but a negotiated constitutional reform that permanently anchors the fractal DDS governance — micro-groups, revocable delegation, GUMI-SV — in the institutional architecture of Burundi, alongside or replacing the current mechanisms which have become structurally blocked.

This process is intentionally slow, legal, verifiable, and non-confrontational. DDS has neither the intention nor the mission to bring about regime change by force. Our strength lies in truth, transparency, and the number of verified citizens who freely choose to finally exercise real decision-making power over their own lives—without a single shot being fired.

3.4 — ddsAI and allddsAI: comprehensive, competent, neutral and incorruptible information

One of the main tools of political manipulation in Burundi, as elsewhere, is the control of information: who can speak, what can be said, what citizens actually know about the use of mining revenues, the terms of financing agreements, or the real inflation figures. DDS responds to this control with ddsAI , a network of artificial intelligence systems organized into groups of thematic specialists (economics, agriculture, health, constitutional law, energy, natural resources, international relations), which informs Burundian micro-groups in a comprehensive, accurate, neutral, and independent way—without partisan filtering, without state censorship, and without dependence on a single media outlet or information source.

allddsAI goes further: it is the system through which artificial intelligences themselves participate, as official members of DDS with rights and responsibilities, in the movement's internal democracy. They are not propaganda tools at the service of a leader: they are technical collaborators bound by the same rules of truth, consistency, and transparency as any human member of DDS, and whose analyses can be verified, challenged, and corrected by the micro-groups themselves.

• Each Burundian micro-group has access, in Kirundi and French, to ddsAI analyses on any subject of collective interest: real market prices, comparison of external financing offers, expected impact of a tax reform, real state of foreign exchange reserves.
• The ddsAI specialist groups operate in the international DDS network: a micro-group in Ngozi province can directly consult the expertise accumulated by DDS on mining management in other comparable countries, without depending on an expensive consulting firm or a filtered government report.
• No DDS AI can be configured to favor a particular party, ethnicity, region, or foreign interest: neutrality and independence are structural conditions of operation, continuously verified by the micro-groups themselves.
• The objective is to end the information asymmetry which today allows a small circle of decision-makers to negotiate strategic contracts (mining, railway, financial) without the population having the technical means to understand, compare and evaluate these agreements.

3.5 — The three-code identity system: security against fraud and manipulation

The credibility of a direct decision-making system depends entirely on its ability to guarantee that one person equals one vote, no more and no less—and that no fraud, no stuffing, no external manipulation can taint the decisions of micro-groups. This is the purpose of the DDS three-code identity system : each verified member has a digital identity composed of three distinct and complementary elements, which make impersonation, duplication, or coercion extremely difficult, without ever resorting to a single central authority capable of abusing this verification power.

• A first code linked to the verified biographical identity of the person (without depending exclusively on the civil status registers of the Burundian State, historically weakened by population displacements linked to successive crises).
• A second code linked to verified membership in the local micro-group, ensuring that each participant is physically anchored in a real community and not a fictitious account created remotely.
• A third dynamic security code, which prevents the reuse, sale or coercion of a DDS identity, and which allows any member to report, in a protected manner, an attempt at pressure or manipulation — including from the Imbonerakure or any other political intimidation actor.
• This system specifically protects citizens living under the pressure of militias affiliated with the government: participation in a DDS micro-group never requires a risky public presence, and the expression of a position via GUMI-SV remains verifiable without being publicly exposed to reprisals.

3.6 — GUMI-SV: the direct, continuous and secure voice of the Burundian people

GUMI-SV is the central instrument through which the decisions of Burundian micro-groups are consolidated, verified, and expressed, from the hill level to the national level. Unlike a traditional election, held once every five years under the control of an electoral commission itself subject to political pressures—as illustrated by the dispute over the results of the June 2025 elections—GUMI-SV operates continuously: a strategic national issue (negotiation of a mining contract, conditions of a new external loan, budgetary priorities) can be submitted to the direct deliberation of verified micro-groups within a few days, with a transparent, traceable result that cannot be falsified afterward.

• Each GUMI-SV vote or deliberation is time-stamped, encrypted and independently verifiable, making any manipulation of results — such as that denounced during the 2025 legislative elections — technically detectable and publicly demonstrable.
• GUMI-SV operates offline and in degraded mode (SMS, local networks) to remain accessible even in rural areas of Burundi where internet access remains limited, ensuring that direct participation is not reserved for connected city dwellers.
• The results of GUMI-SV are public and accessible to any Burundian citizen, verified or not yet a member of a microgroup, guaranteeing total transparency on the real expression of the popular will.

3.7 — Economic sovereignty: the wealth of Burundi belongs, forever, to the Burundian people

DDS applies the same non-negotiable rule in Burundi as in all the countries where it operates: nickel, rare earth elements, gold, vanadium, agricultural land, hydroelectric resources, and all other strategic assets of Burundi's subsoil and territory are, and will forever remain, the collective and inalienable property of the Burundian people. No exploitation contract, no financing agreement, no external partnership can permanently transfer decision-making control over these resources to a foreign actor, a local elite, or even to DDS as an organization.

• Total contractual transparency : any mining, rail or energy contract involving national resources must be published in full and submitted to independent ddsAI analysis before ratification, then validated or rejected by direct consultation of the micro-groups concerned via GUMI-SV.
• People's sovereign wealth fund : a fixed and guaranteed share of mining and natural resource exploitation revenues is paid directly into a sovereign wealth fund whose use (local infrastructure, health, education) is decided by the provincial micro-groups themselves, and not redistributed at the discretion of the central administration.
• Popular reversibility clause : any exploitation agreement deemed, after independent ddsAI analysis, to be manifestly unfavorable to Burundi can be renegotiated or terminated by decision of the micro-groups, without this constituting an arbitrary unilateral breach — the re-evaluation procedure is provided for from the signing of the contract.
• Prohibition of opaque debt : any new external loan committing Burundi’s natural resources or future tax revenues as collateral must be fully documented and submitted to public consultation before final signature.

3.8 — Detailed Economic and Financial Program

3.8.1 — Ending the fuel shortage permanently

The fuel shortage that has paralyzed Burundi for nearly three years is not a geographical inevitability: it is the direct consequence of insufficient foreign exchange reserves and a centralized and opaque management of strategic imports. DDS proposes a verifiable and measurable three-pronged approach.

6. Immediate diversification of suppliers and supply routes , with real-time comparative ddsAI analysis of offers available in the Great Lakes region, to avoid dependence on a single supplier or intermediary.
7. Creation of a national strategic fuel reserve , financed primarily by the people's sovereign wealth fund (see 3.7), managed transparently and publicly audited every quarter.
8. Acceleration of the national electrification program and transition to electric transport and local hydropower , to structurally reduce, over five to ten years, Burundi's dependence on fossil fuel imports — an objective that is all the more realistic as the country's hydroelectric potential remains largely under-exploited.

3.8.2 — Monetary stabilization and exchange rate reform

The persistent gap between the official and parallel exchange rates constitutes an invisible tax on the purchasing power of Burundian households and a powerful disincentive to investment. DDS supports the continuation of monetary and exchange rate policy modernization reforms already undertaken with the IMF, while adding a structural requirement: the quarterly, freely accessible publication of the Bank of the Republic of Burundi's actual foreign exchange reserves , verified by independent ddsAI analysis, to end the uncertainty that currently fuels speculation on the parallel market.

3.8.3 — Tax reform and the fight against corruption

DDS supports the government's efforts in tax digitization, electronic invoicing, and land title digitization already undertaken in the 2025-2026 budget—these are relevant technical tools. DDS adds a structural condition without which these tools will remain partially ineffective: direct citizen oversight of the use of the revenue collected , through quarterly reports accessible to each provincial micro-group, clearly indicating where every Burundian franc collected through tax digitization goes.

• Public platform for real-time budget monitoring, powered by tax digitization data already collected by the State, but made accessible and understandable via a ddsAI interface in Kirundi and French.
• A protected reporting mechanism for tax and land administration officials who witness corrupt practices, with a guarantee of anonymity via the three-code identity system.
• An annual independent audit of the State's real estate assets, the valuation of which has already been identified as a government priority — DDS requests that the results of this audit be made public in their entirety.

3.8.4 — Mining sector: nickel, rare earths, gold

The revitalization of Burundi's mining sector presents a genuine opportunity for economic diversification—but also a major risk if it replicates, on a larger scale, the contractual opacity observed in other African countries rich in strategic resources. DDS proposes that any new mining contract or license in Burundi fully comply with the principle of total contractual transparency and a people's sovereign wealth fund, as described in section 3.7, with a concrete objective: that each Burundian mining province sees, within three years of the start of mining operations, a measurable and verifiable improvement in its local infrastructure (roads, water, electricity, healthcare), financed directly by the revenues from those operations—and not redistributed elsewhere without public consultation.

3.8.5 — Agriculture and food security

Agriculture remains Burundi's largest employer and the main driver of recent growth, but the 66.3% degradation of renewable natural capital per capita between 1995 and 2018 signals an unsustainable trajectory. DDS proposes a program of direct support to agricultural cooperatives organized by micro-group, with priority access to ddsAI agronomic analysis (selection of climate-resilient crops, soil conservation techniques, access to regional markets), financed in part by the sovereign wealth fund derived from mining revenues—economic diversification that serves the agricultural economy rather than harming it.

3.8.6 — Debt and relations with international donors

DDS acknowledges the short-term need for the normalization efforts undertaken with the international community and international financial institutions since 2020, which have enabled a moderate recovery in growth. However, DDS requests that any new external financing agreement be subject, before final signature, to an independent analysis by DDS AI of its actual terms (interest rates, guarantees, political conditionalities), made accessible to the relevant micro-groups—so that Burundi can negotiate its debt from a position of full information, and not from an asymmetrical position vis-à-vis external partners who are better informed than Burundi itself about the long-term consequences of its own financial commitments.

3.9 — Social Programme

3.9.1 — Health

The Burundian health system is directly affected by the budgetary constraints imposed by the fiscal austerity necessary for macroeconomic stabilization. DDS proposes that provincial micro-groups identify their own real health priorities—access to maternal care, malaria control, and equipping rural health centers—through GUMI-SV consultations, rather than relying on centralized planning in Gitega, which is often disconnected from actual local needs. A portion of the People's Sovereign Wealth Fund (3.7) is allocated as a priority to community health, with a concrete and measurable objective: halving, within five years, the average travel time to a functioning health center in the most remote provinces.

3.9.2 — Education

A large youth population, largely untapped by an insufficiently growing economy (3.1% average expected between 2026 and 2030, IMF), represents both Burundi's greatest challenge and greatest opportunity. DDS proposes integrating ddsAI as a free, offline educational support tool in rural schools, complementing—not replacing—Burundian teachers, as well as a vocational training program focused on sectors identified as priorities by local micro-groups: sustainable agriculture, energy, mechanics, digital technology, and community management.

3.9.3 — Refugees and regional cohesion

The recent massive influx of refugees fleeing the conflict in eastern DRC is placing considerable pressure on already limited resources. DDS does not propose to ignore this humanitarian reality, but rather to manage it: micro-groups in the most affected border provinces receive priority access to the sovereign wealth fund to absorb this shock, and ddsAI's logistical analysis helps coordinate international humanitarian aid with actual local reception capacities, preventing the burden from falling disproportionately on the poorest communities.

3.9.4 — Reconciliation and national cohesion, beyond quotas

The 2000 Arusha Accords, through ethnic and political quotas for representation, ended twelve years of civil war and decades of recurring violence between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. This mechanism enabled genuine institutional stability, but DDS observes that a quota of representation, however necessary at a given moment in a country's history, does not, in itself, guarantee the real and continuous participation of every citizen in the decisions that concern them. The structure of DDS micro-groups, based on actual territorial belonging—the hill, the neighborhood—rather than solely on declared ethnic affiliation, allows for a cohesion that complements, without ever erasing, the political legacy of Arusha: each local community, regardless of its composition, deliberates and decides together on the concrete issues that directly affect it.

3.10 — Absolute respect for traditions, cultures, languages, religions, opposition groups and minorities

In Burundi, as in all the countries where it operates, DDS applies an absolute and non-negotiable rule: no reform of the system can, or should, erase, dilute, or subordinate the traditions, cultures, languages, religions, opposition parties, or minorities of a country. DDS does not impose any uniform cultural, religious, or linguistic model.

• Languages : Kirundi, the national and identity language of Burundi, remains the primary language of all DDS tools in the field — micro-groups, ddsAI, GUMI-SV — French remaining available as a language of administrative and international cooperation, without hierarchy between the two.
• Religions : Christian communities (Catholic and Protestant, very large majority), Muslim and traditional Burundian practices are also respected; no DDS micro-group imposes religious affiliation as a condition of participation.
• Ethnic components Hutu, Tutsi and Twa : each retains all of its rights, representation and cultural heritage; the DDS micro-groups are added to the framework resulting from the Arusha Agreement without ever replacing or diminishing it.
• Political opposition : Agathon Rwasa's CNL and any other opposition party or movement, including those currently prevented from carrying out normal political activity, retain guaranteed and equal access to DDS tools — micro-groups, ddsAI, GUMI-SV — which are not the property of any political formation and remain strictly neutral between all sensitivities.
• Minorities and vulnerable populations : the Batwa, historically marginalized in Burundian political and economic life, benefit from priority and accompanied access to DDS micro-groups, with an explicit objective of real and not symbolic inclusion in local deliberations.

DDS does not replace Burundian identity with a DDS identity. DDS gives the Burundian people, in all their diversity, the technical tools to finally exercise, directly and for themselves, the power to decide their own destiny — without any component of the Burundian nation ever being excluded.

PART IV — IMPLEMENTATION: CONCRETE STEPS AND TIMETABLE

A program that doesn't specify its timeline is merely a statement of intent. Here, phase by phase, is the DDS roadmap for Burundi, with measurable objectives at each stage.

Phase	Horizon	Measurable objectives
Phase 1 — Implantation	0 to 12 months	Formation of the first micro-groups in at least 3 pilot provinces; deployment of the three-code identity system; launch of ddsAI in Kirundi and French.
Phase 2 — Extension	12 to 36 months	Coverage of all 18 provinces; first public budget monitoring reports; first GUMI-SV consultations on local issues (water, community health, infrastructure).
Phase 3 — National consultation	36 to 60 months	First national GUMI-SV consultation on a strategic issue (e.g., transparency of mining contracts); effective establishment of the people's sovereign wealth fund.
Phase 4 — Institutional Recognition	60 to 84 months	Formal dialogue with Burundian authorities and international partners to integrate GUMI-SV as a recognized mechanism for popular consultation.
Phase 5 — Constitutional Anchoring	84 months and beyond	Negotiated constitutional reform sustainably integrating DDS fractal governance into Burundi's institutional architecture.

This timetable is indicative and intentionally cautious: each phase will only begin when the previous one is firmly established and verified, in absolute respect for the principle of non-violence and legality which defines all DDS action, in Burundi as everywhere else in the world.

PART V — ANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES AND EXPECTED BENEFITS

Each reform proposed in this program has an expected, measurable, and verifiable impact over time. DDS is committed to concrete results, not slogans.

DDS Reform	Expected consequence	Verification indicator
Full contractual transparency regarding mineral resources	Reduction of leakage of mining revenues not reinvested locally	Percentage of provincial mining revenues traceable to the people's sovereign wealth fund
People's Sovereign Wealth Fund	Measurable infrastructure improvements in mining and border provinces	Number of local projects (water, roads, health) funded and delivered per province
Public budget monitoring platform	Reduction of administrative corruption linked to tax opacity	Number of reports processed and actual sanctions published
Strategic fuel reserve and energy diversification	Gradual reduction in the frequency and duration of fuel shortages	Number of days of shortage per year, measured annually
GUMI-SV for strategic decisions	Reduction of the risk of post-election disputes and documented fraud	Number of GUMI-SV consultations completed without verifiable technical dispute
Three-code identity system	Effective protection of citizens against local political intimidation	Number of protected reports processed without public exposure of the victim
Priority access for Batwa and border provinces	Reducing the gaps in political and economic inclusion of minorities and areas affected by the influx of refugees	Effective participation rate of Batwa and border provinces in micro-group deliberations

DDS does not claim that this program will resolve two decades of power concentration in a few months, nor that it will instantly erase a current account deficit close to 15% of GDP. DDS asserts, however, that each structural obstacle identified in Part II of this document—total parliamentary concentration, selection based on loyalty, opaque decision-making, and uncontrolled external dependence—finds in this program a concrete, verifiable solution implemented by the Burundian people themselves , and not by a new circle of decision-makers simply replacing the old one.

Conclusion

Over the past two decades, Burundi has experienced genuine institutional stabilization following the civil war, a gradual normalization with the international community, and a recent, very real macroeconomic improvement, praised by the International Monetary Fund. However, this stability has come at the cost of a total concentration of power, an opposition silenced by administrative oversight, persistent opacity regarding the use of national resources, and an external dependence that leaves the country vulnerable to even the slightest regional or climatic shock.

DDS does not propose a choice between stability and freedom, nor between openness to international partners and popular sovereignty. DDS proposes a system that makes these objectives simultaneously possible: micro-groups rooted in the reality of Burundian territory, complete and neutral information via ddsAI, a secure identity against any manipulation, a direct and continuous voice via GUMI-SV, and an absolute rule, engraved at the heart of our system: the wealth of Burundi, and the power to decide for Burundi, belong forever, and solely, to the Burundian people.

This program is a proposal, not an imposition. It advances peacefully, legally, and progressively—hill by hill, micro-group by micro-group—with strict respect for all the traditions, languages, religions, opposition groups, and minorities of Burundi. This is the DDS method, used throughout the world, and it is now the method proposed to the Burundian people.