DIRECTDEMOCRACYS

Global Political System of Direct Democracy, Collective Ownership and Shared Leadership

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND SOCIAL PROGRAM

REPUBLIC OF PERU

Critical analysis of reality, concrete solutions and a roadmap towards authentic democracy

Edition: June 2026

Spanish

directdemocracys.org | public.directdemocracys.org

"The riches of Peru and the power to decide about Peru belong exclusively and permanently to the Peruvian people."

Inviolable Principle of DirectDemocracy

PRELIMINARY NOTE: WHAT IS DIRECTDEMOCRACYS

DirectDemocracyS (DDS) is not a conventional political party. It is a pioneering, radical global political system—in the etymological sense of the word, meaning it gets to the root of problems—founded on logic, common sense, rigorous study, respect for reality, the search for truth, internal coherence, and mutual respect among all its members and between the system and the citizens of each country.

DDS operates through the fractal model of micro-groups (1 → 5 → 25 → 125 → 625 → on a scale), non-transferable collective ownership (NTCO), a three-code identity verification system that guarantees anonymity and security simultaneously, ponti umani (human bridges) of coordination, and ddsAI and allddsAI technologies — a democracy of Artificial Intelligences that informs users and groups in a complete, correct, neutral and independent manner, free from all media manipulation and all brainwashing, on DDS's protected platforms.

In this program we apply all these principles and tools to the concrete reality of Peru in 2026, analyzing the current situation without euphemisms, accurately identifying the causes of the problems, and proposing detailed, realistic and fully functional solutions.

The fundamental principle of DDS in every country is absolute and inviolable: the national wealth of each country, and the power to make decisions about that country, must belong exclusively and forever to the people of that country. No elite, transnational corporation, external financial power, or oligarchic political structure can appropriate what belongs to everyone. This principle applies to Peru without exception or nuance.

CHAPTER I — DIAGNOSIS: THE REALITY OF PERU IN 2026

1.1. Structural Political Crisis and the Collapse of Representation

Peru is experiencing one of the deepest political crises in its republican history. The general elections of April 12 and 13, 2026—described by the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) itself as "the most complex in history"—have brutally revealed the exhaustion of the traditional political system. More than 40 parties appeared on a single ballot, fragmentation reached record levels, and the winner of the first round, Keiko Fujimori (Popular Force), obtained only 17.18% of the valid votes. Her rival in the second round, Roberto Sánchez (Together for Peru), barely reached 12.03%.

This fact is devastating in terms of democratic legitimacy: the two candidates vying for the presidency on June 7, 2026, together represent less than a third of the electorate. Blank and invalid votes individually exceeded Keiko Fujimori's vote total. In the words of political analyst Campos, this is a "precarious base" upon which to attempt to build a government mandate.

Even more serious: election day was marred by serious logistical irregularities—delays in opening polling stations, failures in the delivery of electoral materials, especially in Lima—which led the president of the National Elections Board (JNE), Roberto Burneo, to acknowledge that "serious irregularities existed" and that "it was a very serious situation." The director of the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) was arrested the day after the elections. The Carter Center's Mission of Experts, while describing the electoral framework as "largely consistent with international standards," called for "greater public transparency" and respect for the process by candidates and parties.

The most alarming phenomenon, however, is not technical: it is structural. In recent years, Congress has taken systematic steps to undermine the independence of the judiciary and prosecutors. More than half of the members of Congress are under investigation for corruption or other crimes. Peru has had multiple presidents in just a few years: Pedro Castillo was impeached, Dina Boluarte's presidency was declared vacant in October 2025 through an obscure constitutional provision, and the country went to elections under the interim presidency of José María Balcázar. This chronic institutional instability is not accidental: it is the logical outcome of a system designed to perpetuate elites in power at the expense of the citizenry.

Indicator	Fact	Fountain
Winner of the first round (Fujimori)	17.18% valid votes	ONPE 2026
2nd place (R. Sánchez)	12.03% valid votes	ONPE 2026
Congress members under investigation for corruption	> 50%	HRW / Media 2025
Presidents since 2016	7 in less than 10 years	Political History PE
Parties on the 2026 electoral ballot	> 40	ONPE 2026
Elimination of PASO (open primaries)	Yes, it generated proliferation.	Fernando Tuesta / JNE

1.2. Economy: Growth Without Distribution, Wealth Without Owners

The Peruvian economy presents a structural paradox that defines its tragedy: the country possesses extraordinary natural resources—copper, silver, gold, gas, biodiversity, lithium, exceptional agricultural lands—and yet almost 28% of its population lived in monetary poverty in 2024, a figure that remains well above the 20% recorded before the 2019 pandemic. The GDP growth projected by the World Bank for 2024 was a mere 2.5%, supported mainly by increased formal mining production.

The current economic model is, in essence, an enclave-based extractive model: companies—mostly transnational corporations or those linked to concentrated domestic power groups—extract resources from Peru's soil and subsoil, export raw materials with minimal processing, and the profits are distributed among foreign shareholders, local elites, and a state whose redistributive capacity is constantly undermined by corruption and institutional capture. The Peruvian people—the historical and legitimate owners of these resources—receive a minimal fraction of the wealth generated by their own land.

Illegal mining dramatically worsens this situation: according to the National Society of Mining, Petroleum and Energy (SNMPE), illegal mining generates approximately $4 billion annually, produces around 2 million ounces of gold per year that are not included in formal production figures, and fuels smuggling networks to neighboring countries. This money does not reach the Peruvian public treasury; instead, it feeds organized crime, finances political corruption, and destroys ecosystems.

Informal employment affects over 70% of the workforce. Micro and small enterprises (MSEs), which represent more than 95% of Peruvian businesses, operate with extremely limited access to credit and interest rates that put them at a disadvantage compared to large corporations. The gap between Lima and the Andean and Amazonian regions is enormous: access to quality basic services—health, education, drinking water, and internet—varies greatly depending on geography and socioeconomic background.

Economic Indicator	Figure	Year
National monetary poverty	~28% of the population	2024
Poverty before the pandemic	~20%	2019
Projected GDP growth	2.5%	2024
Informal employment	> 70%	2024
Illegal mining (annual movement)	~USD 4 billion	2024
Loss due to crime	35 billion soles	2023
SMEs on the business fabric	> 95%	2024

1.3. Security: The State Abandoned the Citizen

Organized crime has spread throughout Peru with a speed and depth that the state has proven incapable of containing. Homicides, extortion, and other violent crimes have steadily increased. In 2023, the economic impact of crime was estimated at 35 billion soles. Eighty-two percent of police station vehicles were inoperable in 2022. Sixty-one percent of motorcycles and 58% of police trucks assigned to stations were out of service.

Investigative journalism is literally deadly in Peru in 2026: journalist Gastón Medina was murdered in Ica in January 2025 after reporting on irregularities in the regional government and on extortion rings targeting the transportation sector. Journalist Raúl Célis was murdered in Iquitos in May 2025. These are not isolated cases: they are symptomatic of a system in which organized crime has deeply infiltrated state institutions, including the judiciary, local prosecutors' offices, and regional and municipal administrations.

The Comptroller General's Office has documented that corruption affects the majority of the country's municipalities. The State, as one of the government plans analyzed during the campaign stated, "has abandoned the decent population and allowed mafias, organized crime, and corruption to flourish." This is not political rhetoric: it is a factual description of the situation.

1.4. Social Inequality, Education and Health

Social inequality in Peru is not only economic: it is territorial, ethnic, linguistic, and generational. Indigenous communities in the Amazon and Andes suffer the worst indicators in all dimensions of human well-being. The education system consistently places Peru at the bottom of international school performance assessments. The quality of public education is unacceptable compared to the standards that a country with Peru's natural resources should guarantee.

The healthcare system is dual and exclusionary: EsSalud covers formal workers, the Ministry of Health (MINSA) covers the poor with insufficient resources, and those who can afford it have access to quality private healthcare. Rural areas, especially in the highlands and the rainforest, have access to healthcare services that in many cases is practically nonexistent or of critically poor quality. The recent investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office at EsSalud's headquarters for "alleged acts of corruption" perfectly illustrates the state of public healthcare institutions.

1.5. The 2026 Electoral Scenario: Second Round and Its Implications

On June 7, 2026, Peruvians will choose between Keiko Fujimori (Popular Force) and Roberto Sánchez (Together for Peru). This marks the first time in Peru's recent history that a runoff election pits a traditional right-wing candidate against a left-wing candidate, both having such low first-round support. Fujimori, in her fourth presidential bid after three previous defeats, enters the race with a political history marked by corruption charges, the legacy of Fujimorism, and a platform proposing a social market economy with fiscal discipline, police modernization, and support for private investment. Sánchez proposes industrialization, investment in social programs, pensions for women entrepreneurs, and industrialization.

Neither option addresses the underlying problem in a structural and systemic way: the fact that the Peruvian political system, as a whole, has systematically failed its citizens for decades. Both proposals remain within the paradigm of the conventional representative system—where citizens delegate their power to representatives who then act with broad autonomy, without effective mechanisms for direct control, without real accountability, and without the people being able to intervene quickly when representatives deviate from their duties or become corrupt.

This is precisely the fundamental difference between the conventional political system—including its right-wing and left-wing versions—and DirectDemocracyS: DDS does not propose better representatives. DDS proposes eliminating the need to blindly trust representatives, by placing power directly in the hands of citizens who are organized, informed, and protected from all manipulation.

CHAPTER II — CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM

2.1. Representative Democracy as a Mechanism for Delegating Citizen Power

The representative system, as it functions in Peru and most countries worldwide, operates through a mechanism that DirectDemocracyS identifies as structurally flawed: every few years, citizens entrust all their political power to a group of representatives. Once elected, these representatives act with almost total autonomy, making decisions that affect millions of people without direct consultation, and citizens can only evaluate them—imperfectly—in the following election.

This mechanism is not a historical accident: it was designed in an era when instant mass communication was impossible, when information circulated slowly and in a controlled manner by educated elites, and when the direct participation of millions of people in collective decisions seemed technically unfeasible. None of those conditions exist today. Technology allows, in principle, any citizen to vote, deliberate, propose, and monitor in real time. The only reason this doesn't happen is that the political and economic elites who benefit from the current system have no incentive to change it.

In Peru specifically, the result of this system has been: seven presidents in less than ten years, a Congress where more than half of its members are under investigation for crimes, the capture of the judiciary, the proliferation of organized crime infiltrating institutions, and almost 28% of the population living in poverty. If the system functioned as it is supposed to—if representatives genuinely represented the interests of those they represent—these results would be impossible. The fact that these patterns are repeated election after election demonstrates that the problem is not with individuals: it is with the system.

STRUCTURAL CRITIQUE: THE 5 SYSTEMIC FLAWS OF THE PERUVIAN MODEL

1. Irreversible delegation of citizen power between elections. 2. Lack of direct and rapid citizen oversight mechanisms. 3. Information opacity and systematic media manipulation that prevents informed decision-making. 4. Concentration of national wealth in private hands (both domestic and foreign) instead of the people. 5. Institutional design that incentivizes corruption instead of effectively penalizing it.

2.2. The Extractive Model and the Appropriation of National Wealth

For decades, the Peruvian economy has been structured as a system for extracting resources for the benefit of external and internal actors with sufficient power to capture state regulation. Peru's subsoil resources—copper, gold, silver, gas, and lithium—constitutionally belong to the nation. In practice, however, they are exploited through concessions that have historically favored corporations with privileged access to decision-makers. Social conflicts surrounding mining—which have been a driving force behind Peruvian political instability over the past 20 years—are the most visible expression of this contradiction between the people's formal right to their resources and the reality of who actually benefits from their exploitation.

Illegal mining, which generates $4 billion annually according to SNMPE data, is both a cause and a symptom: it causes environmental destruction, violence, and institutional corruption; but it is also a symptom of the State's failure to offer formal, accessible, and equitable avenues for local communities to participate in the economy. When the formal State is perceived as an instrument of the elites rather than of the citizens, informality and illegality inevitably expand.

2.3. Media Manipulation as an Instrument of Control

Media concentration in Peru follows similar patterns to those in other countries in the region: a small number of business groups control the main television, radio, and print media platforms. The mass media are not neutral instruments of information: they are political actors with their own interests or those linked to powerful economic groups. The way they cover elections, corruption scandals, social conflicts, and government programs reflects these interests, not the pursuit of truth.

The result is a citizenry making electoral decisions with incomplete, biased, or outright manipulated information. This is one of the problems that DirectDemocracyS structurally solves through ddsAI and allddsAI: proprietary platforms, protected from external manipulation, where information reaches citizens in a complete, accurate, neutral, and independent manner.

CHAPTER III — THE DIRECTDEMOCRACYS PROGRAM FOR PERU

3.1. Founding Principles Applied to Peru

DirectDemocracyS's program for Peru is not a catalog of campaign promises: it is a coherent, logical, and fully functional system of political, institutional, economic, and social transformation. Each element of the program is interconnected with the others. They cannot be implemented in isolation without losing coherence. The system works as a whole, or it doesn't work at all.

The founding principles that guide this program are the same as those that guide DDS in every country in the world, adapted to the specific reality of Peru:

• The riches of Peru belong exclusively and permanently to the Peruvian people, and never to any elite, corporation or foreign power.
• The power to decide on Peru belongs exclusively and permanently to the organized, informed and protected Peruvian people, not to representatives with white mandates.
• Truth, logic, and common sense are the basis of all decisions, never ideology, populism, or group interests.
• All wealth produced in Peru with Peruvian resources and Peruvian labor must primarily benefit the Peruvian people.
• Democratic participation must be authentic, continuous, direct, rapid, competent, informed, safe and protected.
• The ddsAI and allddsAI technology guarantees complete, neutral and independent information to all citizens, eliminating media manipulation.

3.2. Political-Institutional Reform: Real Direct Democracy

3.2.1. The Fractal Micro-Group Model

Political participation in DirectDemocracyS is not organized through parties that compete for power: it is organized through fractal micro-groups that allow each citizen to participate directly in the decisions that affect them, at all levels, from the neighborhood to the national level.

In the Peruvian context, the model works as follows:

1. Each neighborhood, community, hamlet or residential unit organizes its own micro-group of between 3 and 5 citizens, who know each other, respect each other and deliberate directly on the issues that affect them.
2. Each 5 base micro-groups form a second-level micro-group (up to 25 people), with a coordinator chosen based on verifiable merits through the DDS points system.
3. Every 5 second-level micro-groups form a third-level micro-group (up to 125 people), and so on in fractal scale up to the regional and national level.
4. Each level has decision-making power over issues relevant to its scale. Decisions of national scope require democratic validation at all levels.

This model is particularly well-suited to Peru, where territorial, cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity means that centralized decisions made in Lima are often inadequate for local realities. Micro-groups allow Andean, Amazonian, and coastal communities to participate on equal terms, in their own languages if necessary, regarding their own priorities.

A concrete example: In a rural community in Cusco, the local micro-group can decide on the use of communal lands, negotiations with mining or agribusiness companies, the prioritization of infrastructure projects, and the control of participatory budgeting. Their decisions directly bind regional and national authorities, who cannot ignore them without immediate institutional consequences.

3.2.2. Three-Code Identity Verification System

To ensure that each citizen participates only once, that their identity is verifiable but their vote is secret, and that the system is resistant to manipulation, DDS implements the three-code identity verification system:

• Code 1: Verified identity (name, ID, biometrics) — visible only to the verification system.
• Code 2: Unique anonymous identifier within the platform — not externally linked to the real name.
• Code 3: Specific action code for each vote or decision — expires after use.

This system guarantees that in Peru, where vote buying, voter coercion, and identity theft have been recurring problems, participation is authentic, verifiable in its uniqueness, and completely protected in its content. No external power—not the government, nor corporations, nor organized crime—can know how each citizen voted. It only knows that the vote was legitimate.

3.2.3. Continuous Citizen Control and Rapid Revocation Mechanisms

One of the most serious problems with the current Peruvian political system is that citizens can only "control" their representatives at the ballot box every five years. In the interim, representatives can act with impunity, ignore the government programs on which they were elected, and face no consequences until—if any—the next election.

DirectDemocracyS eliminates this problem structurally: in the DDS system, every representative—at all levels, from the city council to the presidency—is subject to continuous oversight by the micro-groups that elected them. If their actions do not align with their mandate, they can be recalled through a clear, swift, and democratic procedure, without having to wait years. This mechanism is not theoretical: it is integrated into the system's structure and technological platforms.

In the current Peruvian context, where presidents are removed from office through obscure constitutional provisions and Congress is perceived as an instrument of special interests, swift and transparent democratic recall would be an instrument of stability—not instability. The current instability does not stem from citizen oversight; it stems from the absence of genuine citizen oversight and its replacement by parliamentary maneuvering.

3.2.4. DDS Platforms: Manipulation-Free Information

ddsAI and allddsAI technologies are not simply technological tools: they are the democratic infrastructure of the 21st century. In the Peruvian context, where media concentration and information manipulation are chronic, these platforms fulfill a critical function:

• Every citizen has access to complete, verified, neutral information from multiple sources on any political, economic, or social topic.
• DDS specialist groups — organized by disciplines, with members verified by competence and merit, not by political affiliation — analyze and comment on public policy proposals with technical rigor.
• The democracy of Artificial Intelligences (allddsAI) provides summaries, comparisons and analyses of the consequences of each decision, in a way that is understandable to any citizen, in Spanish, Quechua, Aymara or other Peruvian languages.
• DDS platforms are immune to manipulation by traditional media because they are not dependent on them: they are their own platforms, with specific security protocols against media brainwashing.

Expected consequence: In a country where extreme political fragmentation (more than 40 parties in 2026) partly reflects the informational disorientation of citizens, the availability of structured, neutral and accessible information would dramatically reduce electoral volatility, increase the quality of collective decisions and make it much more difficult for groups with media resources to manipulate public opinion.

3.3. Economic Program: From Extraction to People's Ownership

3.3.1. Sovereignty over Natural Resources

The first and most fundamental economic change that DirectDemocracyS proposes for Peru is the transformation of the model of ownership and management of natural resources. Peru's subsoil resources—copper, gold, silver, gas, oil, lithium—are nominally owned by the nation. The DDS program converts this nominal ownership into real and operational ownership through a management system that applies the principle of Non-Transferable Collective Ownership (NTCO).

• All natural resource exploitation concessions are reviewed and renegotiated to ensure that the participation of the Peruvian State — on behalf of the people — is not less than 51% of the net profit of each operation.
• Foreign companies can continue to participate as technical and financial partners, but never as majority owners of resources that belong to the Peruvian people.
• State revenues derived from natural resources are distributed through a Peruvian People's Sovereign Fund (FSPP), managed with radical transparency and direct control by DDS citizen micro-groups.
• A fixed portion of the FSPP — no less than 30% — is allocated to direct investment in the communities where extraction takes place, ensuring that those who suffer the environmental and social impacts of mining receive proportionate and direct benefits.

A concrete example with figures: Peruvian copper generated exports of approximately US$14 billion in 2023. If the Peruvian state were to guarantee the people a 51% share of the net profit—compared to the significantly lower percentage received under the current system—the additional revenue for the Public Pension Fund (FSPP) could exceed US$3–4 billion annually. Implemented systematically over ten years, this would transform the state's capacity for public investment.

Expected consequences: Reduction of social conflict surrounding mining, because affected communities would be co-owners of the benefits. Elimination of the incentive for illegal mining, which thrives where formal mining excludes local communities. Significant increase in resources available for public investment in health, education, and infrastructure.

3.3.2. Tax Reform: Real Equity and the End of Tax Impunity

The Peruvian tax system combines relatively low tax pressure on large corporations and capital with widespread informality, leaving a large part of the economy without a tax base. The result is a state with insufficient resources to finance the public services that the population needs.

DirectDemocracyS proposes a comprehensive tax reform for Peru based on the following principles:

5. Effective progressive taxation of large companies and economic groups, closing legal loopholes and tax evasion and avoidance mechanisms that currently allow corporations with very high profits to pay minimal taxes.
6. A tax on speculative financial transactions — especially applicable to short-term capital movements — that generates significant revenue with minimal impact on productive investment.
7. Gradual and voluntarily incentivized formalization of the informal economy, through the radical reduction of the costs and bureaucracy of formalization, and automatic access to public services and benefits for those who formalize.
8. Radical transparency of public spending: every sol of the national budget is traceable in real time by any citizen through the DDS platforms, with automatic alerts from ddsAI for anomalies or deviations.
9. Elimination of internal tax havens: Free zones and special regimes that allow tax evasion by large amounts of capital are reviewed and redesigned to benefit the poorest areas of the country without becoming instruments of evasion.

Expected consequences: Significant increase in tax revenues without increasing the burden on formal workers and small businesses. Reduction of the public infrastructure deficit. Sustainable financing of a universal, high-quality health and education system.

3.3.3. Industrialization with Added Value and Technological Sovereignty

Peru cannot remain indefinitely an exporter of raw materials without processing. Industrialization with added value is a necessary condition for generating well-paid formal employment, accumulating national technological knowledge, and reducing dependence on international commodity price cycles.

The DDS program proposes the following for Peru:

• Creation of strategic industrial hubs linked to existing natural resources: copper refining, lithium processing for batteries, petrochemical industry, quality agro-industry with designation of origin, textile industry based on Peruvian natural fibers (alpaca, Pima cotton).
• Massive public investment in research and technological development, linking public universities with strategic productive sectors.
• Progressive technological sovereignty: Peru cannot depend indefinitely on foreign technology to manage its own resources. The DDS program includes the training of Peruvian engineers, technicians, and scientists capable of developing and maintaining their own technologies.
• Integration of ddsAI into industrial planning: DDS specialist groups, supported by the system's Artificial Intelligence tools, continuously analyze industrialization opportunities, bottlenecks, and investment needs, providing technical recommendations that citizen micro-groups discuss and approve.

A concrete example: Lithium, of which Peru possesses significant reserves, is the key mineral for the global energy transition—batteries for electric vehicles, renewable energy storage. Currently, if extracted, it is exported as a raw material. With the DDS model, Peru would develop the capacity to produce battery cells domestically, tripling or quadrupling the value of the resource before exporting it, and generating thousands of skilled jobs.

3.3.4. Support for MSMEs and the Popular Economy

Micro and small enterprises are the true productive backbone of Peru. 95% of Peruvian businesses are micro and small enterprises. 70% of the workforce operates in the informal sector, mostly in micro-businesses that lack access to formal credit, technology, and markets that would allow them to grow and formalize their operations.

DirectDemocracy proposes:

• Creation of a first-tier cooperative credit system, managed by DDS micro-groups, that provides financing at affordable rates to entrepreneurs and SMEs, with community guarantees instead of individual asset guarantees.
• Digital Direct Sales Platforms (DDS) that allow Peruvian producers — especially in rural areas — to sell their products directly to national and international consumers, eliminating unnecessary intermediaries.
• Technical and business training programs integrated into the DDS micro-groups, with practical content, verified by groups of specialists and accessible in Spanish and native languages.
• A radical reduction of the bureaucratic burden for business formalization, with complete digitization of procedures and elimination of all unnecessary steps that today make formalizing a small business in Peru costly, slow and discouraging.

3.4. Financial Program: Banking System at the Service of the People

3.4.1. Public Development Bank

Access to credit in Peru remains one of the main obstacles to economic development for the majority of the population. Private banks, operating with a profit-maximization logic, direct credit toward sectors and actors that offer the greatest guarantees and returns—by definition, those who already have resources. The poorest sectors and entrepreneurs without capital are excluded or forced to accept usurious interest rates.

The DDS program proposes the creation of a Peruvian People's Development Bank (BDPP), with mixed capital—public and from DDS micro-groups—whose mandate is not to maximize profits but to maximize inclusive economic development. The BDPP:

• It finances productive projects in strategic sectors with interest rates that reflect the real cost of money plus a minimum margin of institutional sustainability.
• It operates with project evaluation criteria that prioritize positive social and environmental impact, not just financial return.
• It is managed with radical transparency: all its movements are auditable in real time by citizens through the DDS platforms.
• It promotes banking services for excluded sectors, especially in rural areas, through digital branches accessible from mobile phones.

3.4.2. Universal Guaranteed Minimum Income System (IMGU-SV)

DirectDemocracy proposes the gradual implementation in Peru of a Universal Guaranteed Minimum Income linked to Voluntary Services (IMGU-SV), following the methodology developed by DDS in its global program. The IMGU-SV is not a passive subsidy or a clientelistic handout: it is the recognition that in a 21st-century economy with natural resources like those of Peru, no citizen should live in extreme poverty, and that voluntary contributions to the community—through socially beneficial activities not covered by the market—are worthy of public compensation.

The Peruvian IMGU-SV would be structured in phases:

10. Phase 1 (years 1-3): Pilot program in 3-5 regions selected based on poverty levels and existing community organization, with a base income equivalent to the cost of the basic family food basket. Beneficiaries voluntarily contribute to community service activities verified by DDS micro-groups.
11. Phase 2 (years 4-7): Gradual national expansion, financed with additional revenues from the FSPP (Sovereign Fund of the Peruvian People) and tax reform.
12. Phase 3 (years 8-15): Consolidation and upward adjustment of the base income based on economic growth and the reduction of implementation costs thanks to digitization.

Expected consequences: Elimination of extreme poverty within the implementation period. Significant reduction in poverty-related crime. Boosting of domestic consumption in rural areas. Recognition and encouragement of unpaid community work that currently sustains large sectors of Peruvian society (especially the work of women in rural communities).

3.4.3. Control of Financial Capital and End of Speculation

Peru experienced the effects of international financial volatility in 2026: the election campaign was closely watched by markets, with attention focused on the exchange rate and economic policy expectations. The sol's dependence on the dollar and international commodity prices is a structural vulnerability that the current model does not address.

DirectDemocracy proposes measures to protect the Peruvian financial system against speculation:

• Regulation of short-term speculative capital movements through a Tobin tax adapted to the Peruvian context.
• Strengthening the BCRP's international reserves as an instrument of active stabilization, with transparent criteria and controlled by the DDS citizen micro-groups.
• Policies of gradual de-dollarization of the domestic economy, encouraging the use of the sol in domestic transactions and reducing vulnerability to decisions by the US Federal Reserve.
• Guarantees of institutional continuity of the BCRP with real independence from political cycles, within the framework of transparency and citizen control guaranteed by the DDS system.

3.5. Security Program: State Present, Organized Crime Out

3.5.1. Comprehensive Reform of Citizen Security

Public safety in Peru requires a reform that goes beyond simply increasing the number of police officers or harsher penalties. The expansion of organized crime is not a problem of insufficient police force: it is a problem of a weak state, institutional corruption, a lack of economic opportunities, and the capture of institutions by organized crime.

The DDS program for Peruvian security operates on three simultaneous axes:

13. Institutional Focus: Radical professionalization of the Peruvian National Police through a recruitment, training, and continuous evaluation system based on verifiable merit, with competitive compensation that eliminates the economic incentive for corruption. The 82% of inoperable vehicles documented in 2022 is not a budget problem: it is a problem of corrupt management of the existing budget. DDS introduces real-time citizen auditing systems for police equipment and operations.
14. Community focus: DDS micro-groups act as organized community watch networks, communicating directly with law enforcement through secure channels on DDS platforms. Communities know their territory better than any external police force: organized citizen information is the best tool for preventative intelligence.
15. Structural axis: Organized crime thrives where there are no legitimate economic alternatives. DDS's economic program—IMGU-SV, support for micro and small enterprises, industrialization—eliminates the social conditions that make criminal recruitment a rational option for young people with no other prospects.

Specifically: The expansion of drug trafficking in the VRAEM and other coca-growing regions cannot be resolved solely through crop eradication; it requires genuine alternative economic development programs with real public investment and community participation in program design and management. DDS provides the organizational structure—local micro-groups—and the technology—ddsAI—to ensure these programs are truly participatory and effective.

3.5.2. Fight Against Corruption: System, Not Rhetoric

Every Peruvian presidential candidate in the last 20 years has promised to fight corruption. The results are well known: more than half of the congressmen investigated for crimes, presidents who end up in prison or facing charges, and a captured judiciary. Corruption isn't fought with rhetoric or more laws; it's fought by changing the structural incentives that generate it.

DirectDemocracy proposes the following for Peru:

• Radical transparency of public spending: every contract, every concession, every transfer of public funds is visible in real time to any citizen on the DDS platforms. Opacity is the lifeblood of corruption: without opacity, corruption cannot survive.
• Protected reporting system integrated into the DDS platforms, with cryptographic protection of the complainant's identity and automatic tracking of each report.
• Groups of specialists in public ethics and institutional control, who monitor in real time the behavior of all public officials and alert citizen micro-groups to any anomaly.
• End of political impunity: no public office—including the presidency, Congress, and the judiciary—confers immunity from legal responsibility for acts of corruption. Citizen recall mechanisms are automatically activated upon a final conviction.
• Reform of the public procurement system through a fully transparent digital bidding system, with citizen participation in the evaluation of proposals through DDS micro-groups.

3.6. Social Program: Health, Education and Wellbeing for All

3.6.1. Universal and Quality Health System

Peru deserves a healthcare system that doesn't depend on a patient's financial means to determine the quality of care they receive. The current system—with EsSalud for those in the formal sector, MINSA for the poor, and private healthcare for those who can afford it—is structurally unfair and operationally inefficient.

DirectDemocracy proposes:

• Progressive merger of EsSalud and MINSA into a single universal health system, financed by the State through FSPP revenues and tax reform, and managed with direct participation of citizen micro-groups in the supervision of each health establishment.
• Massive investment in health infrastructure, especially in rural areas of the mountains and jungle, where access to basic medical care is currently dramatically insufficient.
• Accelerated training of health personnel — doctors, nurses, technicians — with service commitments in rural areas, compensated with salary and career incentives higher than the current ones.
• Preventive medicine as a priority: community preventive health programs organized by DDS micro-groups, with support from groups of medical specialists and the ddsAI platform that provides accessible and personalized health information.
• Continuous investigation and oversight of EsSalud and all public health facilities by citizen micro-groups, with access to real-time management data.

3.6.2. Transformative Education: From Memorization to Critical Thinking

Peruvian education, as measured by international standards, produces unacceptable levels of reading comprehension and mathematical reasoning. The problem is not a lack of dedication among teachers; it is an educational system designed for the reproduction of knowledge rather than the development of skills, with outdated curricula, insufficient teacher training, and dilapidated infrastructure.

The DDS program for Peruvian education:

• Curriculum reform based on the development of critical thinking, analytical skills, active citizenship and skills for the 21st century economy, with maintenance and strengthening of native languages and cultures.
• Ongoing teacher training, with groups of DDS pedagogy specialists who provide continuous updates to teachers and evaluate the quality of educational outcomes.
• Use of the ddsAI platform as a pedagogical tool: each Peruvian student has access to a virtual tutor that adapts to their level and needs, in Spanish and in their native languages.
• Massive investment in connectivity: no Peruvian school can be left without access to quality internet. Universal connectivity is the basic infrastructure for 21st-century education and democratic participation.
• Pedagogical autonomy of local micro-groups: parents, teachers and students organized in DDS micro-groups participate directly in the design and evaluation of their school's educational project, within the national curriculum framework.
• Equitable educational financing: eliminating the resource gap between schools in Lima and rural schools, with compensatory investment that prioritizes areas with the greatest historical deficit.

3.6.3. Environmental Protection and Ecological Sovereignty

Peru possesses some of the most biodiverse ecosystems on the planet, including a significant portion of the Amazon rainforest. The destruction of these ecosystems—through illegal mining, deforestation for extensive agriculture, and river pollution—is not only an environmental disaster: it is a crime against the enduring heritage of the Peruvian people and of humanity.

DirectDemocracy proposes:

• Renewable natural resources and Peruvian ecosystems are part of the permanent wealth of the Peruvian people: their destruction is equivalent to the destruction of public capital and is treated as such in legal and criminal terms.
• The Amazonian and Andean indigenous communities, who have been the historical custodians of these ecosystems, have direct participation and veto rights over any project that affects their territory, organized through their own DDS micro-groups with technological support from ddsAI.
• National program for the environmental remediation of historical mining liabilities, financed by the responsible companies through the "polluter pays" principle, with direct participation of the affected communities in the design and supervision of the remediation programs.
• An energy transition based on Peru's abundant renewable resources: solar on the coast and highlands, sustainable hydropower, and wind power in suitable regions. Peru can be self-sufficient in clean energy and export the surplus.

3.7. Implementation of DDS in Peru: Roadmap

Phase 0 — Presence and Information (Months 1-6)

The implementation process of DirectDemocracyS in Peru begins with an informational presence: Peruvian citizens need to know what DDS is, what it proposes, and how they can participate. This phase requires no prior political structure or permission from existing institutions; it is a voluntary process of information gathering, registration, and organization.

• Launch of the DDS platform in Spanish for Peru, with all the information about the system, the principles, the program and the participation mechanisms.
• Groups of Peruvian specialists — lawyers, economists, engineers, doctors, educators, community activists — are integrated into DDS specialist groups, contributing their specific knowledge of the Peruvian context.
• Information campaigns in Spanish, Quechua, Aymara and other native languages, using digital platforms and existing community channels.
• The human bridge (ponte umano) coordinator of DDS for Peru establishes communication with community leaders, social organizations, unions, professional associations and academic institutions willing to collaborate.

Phase 1 — Organization of Micro-Groups (Months 6-18)

As the number of registered users on the Peruvian DDS platform grows, the first micro-groups begin to form in neighborhoods, communities, and organizations that express interest. In this phase:

• The three-code identity verification system is implemented for the Peruvian context, in coordination with the legally established authorities regarding identity verification.
• The first base micro-groups begin to deliberate on their local priorities and familiarize themselves with the DDS mechanisms.
• Peruvian specialist groups in ddsAI and allddsAI are activated, providing information and analysis to micro-groups on topics of interest to them.
• The micro-groups present their first concrete proposals to existing institutions — municipalities, regional governments, Congress — using the citizen participation mechanisms already existing in Peruvian legislation.

Phase 2 — Growing Democratic Influence (Years 2-5)

With a growing base of organized micro-groups throughout Peru, DDS reaches the critical mass that allows it to exert a decisive influence on national politics:

• The DDS micro-groups actively participate in municipal and regional participatory budgeting processes, using the mechanisms already existing in Peruvian legislation.
• Candidates who support the DDS program — or who adopt elements of it in their platforms — receive organized support from micro-groups in the electoral processes.
• The ddsAI platform analyzes the behavior of all elected representatives in real time, publishing periodic evaluations accessible to all citizens.
• Constitutional and legal reforms are being promoted to incorporate DDS's direct democracy mechanisms into the Peruvian institutional framework: binding citizen referendum, simplified recall of mandates, radical transparency of public spending.

Phase 3 — Systemic Transformation (Years 5-15)

In the maturity phase, the Peruvian DDS system operates at full capacity, with active micro-groups throughout the territory, groups of specialists in all relevant disciplines, and technological platforms that guarantee the informed, secure and continuous participation of millions of citizens:

• The FSPP is operational and distributes natural resource revenues annually in a transparent and equitable manner.
• The IMGU-SV is fully implemented, eliminating extreme poverty.
• The universal health system is operational throughout the territory.
• The educational reform produces the first graduates trained in the new model.
• Structural corruption has been dramatically reduced by radical transparency and citizen control mechanisms.
• Peru is internationally recognized as the first Latin American country to have implemented a genuine direct democracy model on a national scale.

CHAPTER IV — COMPARISON: CURRENT SYSTEM VS. DIRECT DEMOCRACYS

Dimension	Current System	DirectDemocracy
Citizen participation	I vote every 5 years, with no oversight between elections	Continuous, direct, real-time participation
Citizen information	Concentrated, biased, manipulable media	DDS platforms: neutral, complete, independent
Control of representatives	Only in subsequent elections	Quick and direct citizen recall
Ownership of natural resources	State nominal, corporate real	Effective collective ownership by the people (NTCO)
Distribution of wealth	Extremely concentrated	FSPP: equitable and transparent distribution
Fight against corruption	Rhetoric without structural mechanisms	Radical transparency + real-time citizen oversight
Citizen security	Police with weakened institutions	Community + institutional + structural
Access to health and education	Unequal according to income	Universal, equitable and of quality
Illegal mining	Growing, $4 billion USD/year	Reduced by real economic alternatives
Extreme poverty	~28% in poverty (2024)	Progressive elimination via IMGU-SV

4.1. Expected Short-Term Consequences (1-3 years)

The first visible consequences of implementing the DDS program in Peru would be:

• Increased informed citizen participation: citizens who join the DDS system gain access to higher quality information and develop political analysis skills that reduce their vulnerability to manipulation.
• Reduction of social conflict around mining in pilot areas where DDS micro-groups are active and benefit-sharing agreements begin to be implemented.
• Greater transparency of municipal and regional public spending in jurisdictions where DDS micro-groups actively participate in citizen oversight.
• First measurable improvements in citizen security indicators in communities with active DDS micro-groups, thanks to community organization and direct communication with security forces.

4.2. Expected Consequences in the Medium Term (3-10 years)

• Significant reduction of monetary poverty, combining the IMGU-SV with more inclusive economic growth resulting from structural reforms.
• Substantial increase in state revenues derived from natural resources, thanks to the renegotiation of contracts and the control of illegal mining.
• Measurable improvement in educational indicators, especially in regions with greater investment and implementation of curriculum reform.
• Universal health system operational in the pilot regions, with progressive expansion at the national level.
• Drastic reduction of corruption at institutional levels where radical transparency and citizen control by DDS operate with full effectiveness.

4.3. Expected Long-Term Consequences (10-25 years)

• Peru is positioned as one of the countries with the highest quality democracy in the world, thanks to the continuous direct participation system of DDS.
• Structural elimination of extreme poverty through the consolidated IMGU-SV.
• A diversified economy with added value, less dependent on commodities and more resilient to international cycles.
• Generations educated in critical thinking, active citizenship, and the skills for the knowledge economy.
• Amazonian and Andean ecosystems protected and sustainably managed by the communities that inhabit them, with international recognition.
• The riches of Peru — all its natural resources, its culture, its biodiversity, its human capital — truly, effectively and irreversibly belong to the Peruvian people.

CHAPTER V — CONCLUSION: THE PERU THAT THE PEOPLE DESERVE

Peru in 2026 finds itself at a crossroads. The April 12 elections revealed a political system on the verge of legitimacy collapse: the two candidates in the June 7 runoff represent less than a third of the electorate. Organized crime has spread throughout the country. Nearly 28% of the population lives in poverty. Natural resources—belonging to the Peruvian people—are disproportionately used to finance foreign corporations and domestic elites. Corruption has permeated almost every state institution.

These are not inevitable tragedies. They are the predictable result of a political and economic system that concentrates power and wealth in the hands of a few, excludes the majority of citizens from decisions that affect them, and lacks structural mechanisms to correct itself when it fails—because those who control it have no interest in seeing it corrected.

DirectDemocracyS doesn't propose better representatives. It doesn't propose voting for the least bad candidate. It proposes something bolder, more logical, and more honest: changing the system that produces bad candidates. It proposes returning power to the Peruvian people—not as an electoral slogan forgotten the day after winning the election, but as a permanent institutional framework, verifiable in real time, and technologically protected against all manipulation.

Peru's wealth belongs to the Peruvian people. The power to decide Peru's future belongs to the Peruvian people. DirectDemocracyS is the system that makes these statements true.

DirectDemocracyS invites every Peruvian citizen—regardless of origin, language, region, economic status, or political affiliation—to learn about the system, register on the DDS platforms, form or join a micro-group in their community, and begin exercising the real democracy they deserve. Peru's transformation will not come from above: it will come from the free, informed, and conscious organization of millions of citizens who decide to take into their own hands what has always belonged to them.

directdemocracys.org | public.directdemocracys.org | allddsAI | ddsAI

June 2026 — Program developed by DirectDemocracyS for Peru